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Abstract 
 
Academic and commercial interest in the corporate governance practices of publicly listed 
companies has increased significantly in recent years (Rossouw, 2005). With high-profile 
corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom heightening the interest in corporate governance 
practices (Rashid, 2011). It has become evident that the performance of well governed firms is 
superior to that of less well governed firms (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). Despite the 
fact that corporate governance is multi-dimensional (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005), this 
study focused on the impact of board composition (defined by the percentage representation of 
independent non-executive directors on the board) and board size on the firm performance 
measures namely; Tobin’s Q (TOB), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) of 
firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Annual data, from the period 2006 
to 2012 was used while the analysis of data was done using the Multiple Regression Analysis 
Model. After having analysed the research results, it was found that no significant relationship 
exists between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board and board 
size, and firm performance measures. Thus, this research study suggests that performance of 
South African companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange is not influenced by board 
composition and board size.   
 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, firm performance, Tobin’s Q, board composition, board size 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Corporate failures and massive corporate scandals, including Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat 
internationally, and LeisureNet, Regal Treasury Bank Limited and Saambou Limited in South 
Africa in recent years have aroused considerable interest in the literature and research on 
corporate governance principles and codes of best practices with a view both to improving 
corporate governance and to enhancing corporate performance and survival (Sanda, Garba, & 
Mikailu, 2011). The role of the board of directors constitutes an important element in the 
implementation of corporate governance (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). The board monitors the 
management of the organisation, sets the strategic direction for the organisation, reviews and 
ratifies management proposals, and is in fact the primary and dominant internal corporate 
governance mechanism within the organisation (Brennan, 2006). The King
1
 Reports on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa, The King Codes of Governance Principles and the 
Companies Act, 2008
2
 makes a number of recommendations about boards and their function in 
Corporate South Africa (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2013; IOD, 2012). 
 
The need to adopt the correct corporate governance mechanisms is driven by the agency problem 
and also the associated free-rider problem that make it difficult for any single investor or 
stakeholder to bear the cost of monitoring managers (Sanda et al. 2011). Agency theory (Jensen 
                                                 
1
 The King Committee on governance issued all King reports on governance for South Africa (the Reports) and also 
the King Codes of Governance Principles (the codes) in 1994, 2002, and 2009. Together these are referred to as 
King I, King II, and King III respectively. 
2
 Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2008 requires that the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or 
under the directions of the board, which has authority to exercise all of the powers and perform the functions of the 
company. 
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& Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) has emerged as a dominant approach in the literature on 
economics and finance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). The theory focuses on aligning the 
interests of owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) 
and is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the interests of the owners 
of an organisation and its management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The theory suggests that a board 
of which the majority of members are independent non-executive directors would be able to 
monitor any self-interested actions on the part of managers (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Bathala & 
Rao, 1995; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Kaymark & Bektas, 2008), and this, in turn would enhance 
the organisation’s performance (Luan & Tang, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, resource dependence theory explains how external dependencies may be 
reduced by linking an organisation to its external environment through both networking and 
legitimacy (Huse, 2007). Huse (2007) notes that, boards of directors may contribute to the 
financial performance of an organisation by including directors who have either direct or indirect 
access to, control of or knowledge of important external resources or influential groups. Thus, 
boards are chosen to maximize the provision of important resources to the firm (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Klein (1998), for example, suggests that the advisory 
requirements of the chief executive officer (CEO) should increase to the extent to which a firm 
depends on the environment for resources. Klein (1998) uses the ratio of debt to assets (book 
leverage) as a proxy for this dependence. Anderson, Bates, Bizjak and Lemmon (2000) states 
that firms with bigger boards usually have a lower cost of debt. 
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The board of directors of a corporation performs the critical function of monitoring and advising 
the executive management on the corporation’s strategy (Rashid, 2011; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989). As advocated by agency theory, conventional wisdom also suggests that a higher level of 
board independence would enable the more effective monitoring and improvement of firm 
performance (Huse, 2007). Prior studies have documented that a majority of independent non-
executive boards ensures better decisions from the perspective of the shareholder’s as regards the 
carrying out discrete tasks such as the hiring and firing of the CEO (Weisbach, 1988, 
Borokhovich, Parrino, & Trapani, 1996), the adoption of anti-takeover provisions (Brickley, 
Coles, & Terry, 1994), and negotiating takeover premiums (Byrd & Hickman, 1992, Cotter, 
Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997). 
 
Both institutional investors and corporate governance entities have called for boards dominated 
by independent non-executive director (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2004). The Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association – College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), one of the largest 
pension funds in the world, has stated that it will not invest in companies that do not have a 
majority of independent non-executive directors on their boards (Coles et al. 2004). Similarly, 
the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS), another large pension fund, 
recommends that the CEO should be the only executive director on a firm’s board (Coles et al. 
2004). Such institutional pressure has resulted in a decrease in both board size (Wu, 2003) and in 
the number of executive on the board of directors (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001). 
 
Another important factor that is deemed to affect the ability of a board to function effectively is 
the size of the board (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and 
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Jensen (1993) suggest that larger boards may be less effective than smaller boards as a result of 
the co-ordination problems experienced by larger boards and also problems such as director free-
riding. In addition, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) have provided 
evidence that firms with smaller boards have higher Tobin’s Q3. While Klein (1998), argues that 
a CEO’s need for advice increases with the complexity of the organisation. Diversified firms are 
more complex than less diversified firms (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Both Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), and Yermack (1996), suggest that the CEOs of diversified firms have a greater 
need for advice than the CEOs for less diversified firms as they operate in multiple segments, 
and therefore they require larger boards. 
 
Despite the fact that the results cited above are extremely interesting, they nevertheless raise the 
question as to why large boards with a high concentration of executive directors do, in fact, exist 
(Coles et al. 2004). Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) raise the following question, namely “Why 
has economic Darwinism not eliminated these unfit organisational forms?” Bhagat and Black 
(2002), on the other hand question whether “executive directors play valuable roles that may be 
lost in a single-minded drive for greater independent non-executive boards.” McConnell (2002) 
urges caution in compelling companies to conform to a single model of board composition, while 
the King III report (2009) recommends that an optimal mix of executive and independent non-
executive directors serve on boards (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. This ratio has been widely used 
incorporate finance as a proxy for firm value/firm performance (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988;McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Yermack, 1996;Bhagat & Black, 2002) 
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1.2 Corporate governance: – the South African context 
Corporate governance in South Africa was not precipitated by any significant crisis in the 
corporate sector as was the case in certain other countries, but by concerns about competitiveness 
following the re-admission of South Africa to the global economy after the country’s transition 
to a fully-fledged democracy with the collapse of apartheid in 1994 (Malherbe & Segal, 2001). 
Corporate governance has developed significantly since both the establishment of the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance in 1992, and the release of the first King Report (King I) in 
November 1994 (Armstrong, 2003) and also as a result of the instigation of the Institute of 
Directors of Southern Africa (IOD, 2002). 
The King I Report focused attention on the importance of a properly functioning board of 
directors as a key ingredient of effective corporate governance (Armstrong, 2004). Despite the 
fact that King I advocated many of the standards and principles which had been adopted in 
several Commonwealth countries, following the release of the Cadbury Report in the United 
Kingdom in 1992, the King I report was perhaps distinguished by its integrated approach to good 
governance in the interests of a wide range of stakeholders in respect of sound financial, social, 
ethical and environmental practice (IOD, 2002). 
Armstrong (2004) noted that, up until the early 1990’s; the South African economy was 
characterised by a small number of mining finance houses that had dominated the economy. 
These mining finance houses had included diverse activities and investments, and had operated 
primarily in South Africa on account of both the stringent exchange control restrictions and the 
political isolation of the economy (Harrison, 2003). The consequence of this was that the 
effective functioning of market mechanisms and a sound corporate culture of transparency and 
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disclosure had been largely stifled while, accompanied by excessive rent seeking on the part of 
the government and a complacent private sector management (Armstrong, 2004). At the same 
time, the capital and money markets, though mature and well developed by emerging market 
standards, were dominated by a small number of large insurance and pension funds with mutual 
ownership structures in which the same private sector institutions were central (Harrison, 2003). 
In addition, the utilities, infrastructure industries as well as the key strategic sectors of the 
economy were under government controlled state-owned enterprises. The rationale for state 
involvement was overtly political and no serious thought was given to issues of governance 
(Armstrong, 2004). 
By the beginning of the truly democratic political dispensation in 1994, South Africa’s economy 
was in an advanced state of decline as a result of political isolation, inward-looking economic 
policies and the legacy of racial exclusion (Armstrong, 2004).  In addition, the economy was 
vulnerable to external forces because of insufficient net inflows and an unattractive investment 
climate (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). This resulted in a policy of economic liberalisation, with 
special emphasis on capital market development and corporate reform (Rossouw, 2005). The 
creation of sound macro-economic fundamentals has enabled more micro-economic targeted 
reforms aimed at generating economic growth levels which would address South Africa’s policy 
goals, with corporate governance playing a significant role in this process (Malherbe & Segal, 
2001). 
Post 1994, South Africa’s financial system has emerged as a sophisticated and well developed 
sector of the economy, with marked similarities to the major financial centres of the developed 
world (Armstrong, 2004) In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) size, both private sector 
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lending and the equity market rank as one of the best in the world. The increasing importance of 
financial services in the economy and the role it plays in the asset allocation process have 
increased the pressure for market reforms in order to improve transparency and efficiency and 
also a more vibrant corporate governance reforms and principles that align with those of the 
developed economies such as the United Kingdom and the United States (Armstrong, 2004). 
This pressure, in turn led to the King Committee on Corporate Governance releasing an updated 
version of the King I report, namely, the King Report 2002 (King II). King II recognises the 
importance of board structure, accountability and independence as regards effective corporate 
governance (Rossouw, 2005). King II contains guidelines and standards on good corporate 
governance practices, and in essence adopts the concept of stakeholder reporting. 
 
A third report (King III) on corporate governance in South Africa became necessary because of 
the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) and also changes in international governance trends 
(IOD, 2009; Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2013). South African listed companies are regarded by 
foreign institutional investors as ranking among the best governed in the world‘s emerging 
economies and it is essential that the country strive to maintain this high ranking (IOD, 2009) As 
evidenced by the significant capital inflows into South Africa before the global financial crisis in 
2008, South Africa’s economy has benefited significantly as a result of the fact that its listed 
companies adhere to sound governance principles and practices (IOD, 2009).  The existence of 
King III and the Act establishes the relevance of this research study within the South African 
context. A more comprehensive review of the relevant provisions of King III is contained in 
Chapter 2. 
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1.3 Statement of the research problem 
 
Corporate failures and scandals such as those of Enron, WorldCom and HIH, and Regal Treasury 
Bank in South Africa, amongst others, have raised a question regarding the ability of the board of 
an organisation to monitor management effectively and enhance firm performance (Rashid, 
2011; Mizruchi, 2004). This issue is particularly relevant in view of the fact that the boards in 
question were apparently not sufficiently effective to have been able to check some of the 
corporate governance failures, as they later came to be known. This in turn, focused attention on 
the composition and size of these boards. According to Rashid (2011) this raised the following 
important question, namely; “Who will monitor the monitors?” Although it is agreed that the 
shareholders may monitor the board by exercising their ownership right in appointing and 
removing board members, the shareholders may not be aware of the inside activities of the firm 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). 
 
1.3.1 Research questions 
 Does board composition (executive vs independent non-executive directors) influence 
firm performance and also comply with the requirements/recommendation on board 
composition as contained in King III and the Companies Act 2008? 
 Does board size influence firm performance? 
 
The following research hypotheses were formulated in response to the research questions: 
 Does board composition (executive vs independent non-executive directors) influence 
firm performance and also comply with the requirements/recommendation on board 
composition as contained in King III and the Companies Act 2008?  
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H0: There is an insignificant positive relationship between board composition (proportion of 
outside independent directors) and firm performance in South Africa. 
 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between board composition (proportion of outside 
independent directors) and firm performance in South Africa. 
 Does board size influence firm performance? 
 
H0: Board size is not positively correlated with firm performance. 
 
H1: Board size is positively correlated with firm performance. 
  
1.4 Purpose of the study 
 
This study examines the impact of board composition and board size on the economic 
performance of firms in South Africa. Thus, the study sought to provide additional evidence of 
the efficiency of board composition and size by examining the explanatory and predictive power 
of board composition and size in order to determine whether board composition and size could 
both explain and predict firm performance as measured by the Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE within 
the South African context.  
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
 
This study is significant because it attempts to analyse the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and the financial performance of firms in South Africa thus providing the 
basis for a framework for institutional regulations. Despite the fact that studies by Fama and 
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Jensen (1983), Baysinger and Butler (1985), and Baysinger and Hoskinsson (1990), have 
asserted that the effectiveness of a board depends on an optimal mix of executive and non-
executive directors, there is very little theory on the determinants of an optimal board 
composition (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). The majority of previous studies have used data 
from the developed nations such as the United States and United Kingdom and it is questionable 
whether the findings of such studies are applicable in alternative regions with different social and 
environmental factors for example in South Africa. It is, thus, anticipated that this study with its 
focus on South Africa will make valuable contribution to the existing literature on the South 
African market and Africa as a whole. 
 
1.6 Definition of terms 
 
Board of directors – A board of directors is a body of elected members who jointly oversee the 
activities of a company or organization. 
 
Independent non-executive directors – is a member of the board of directors of a company 
who does not form part of the executive management team. They are not employees of the 
company or affiliated with it in any other way and are differentiated from executive directors. 
 
Corporate governance - is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions 
affecting the way a corporation (or company) is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate 
governance also includes the relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals 
for which the corporation is governed. 
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1.7 Layout of the study 
 
The remainder of the research study is organised as follows; chapter 2 contains a discussion of 
relevant literature and explains the formulation of the research hypotheses. The purpose of the 
literature review is to provide a basic theoretical and empirical foundation for the study, as well 
as to extend the conversation on the value relevance of board composition and board size to firm 
performance. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used in the study and, as such, discusses the 
data collection and analysis processes as well as, the key variables used in the study. While 
Chapter 4 discusses the research results relating to board composition and size and firm 
performance. Finally chapter 5 concludes the study by summarising of the research findings, 
presenting the conclusions drawn from the research results, suggesting recommendations and 
areas for further research, and discussing the limitations of the study.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Various definitions have been suggested for the concept of corporate governance (Kyereboah-
Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). Charkham (1994, p.1) and Cadbury (1992, p.15) both define 
corporate governance “as the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. While, 
Metrick and Ishii (2002, p.2) define corporate governance from the perspective of the investor as 
“both the promise to repay a fair return on capital invested and the commitment to operate a firm, 
efficiently given investment”. Metrick and Ishii (2002) argue that the level of organisational 
governance may be more important for developing markets with weaker institutions as it helps to 
distinguish between organisations.  
 
Corporate governance is concerned with the relationship between the internal governance 
mechanisms of corporations and society’s perception of the scope of corporate accountability 
(Deakin & Hughes, 1997). Corporate governance has also been defined by Keasey, Thompson 
and Wright (1997, p.12) as including “the structures, processes, cultures and systems that 
engender the successful operation of organisations”. In addition corporate governance may be 
seen as the entire set of measures that are taken within the social entity that is an enterprise in 
order to encourager the economic agents to take part in the productive process and, thus to 
generate some organisational surplus, and to set up a fair distribution between the shareholders, 
taking into consideration what they have brought to the organisation (Labie, 2001). 
 
In the main this research study has adopted the definition of corporate governance of Huse 
(2007, p.15) who defines corporate governance “as concerned with ways of bringing the interests 
  
20 
 
of (shareholders and managers) into line and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of 
shareholders by board of directors”. This definition has its origin in the separation of the 
ownership and the leadership of corporations that was discussed in the early 1930s (Berle & 
Means, 1932). This definition was deemed relevant to the research topic as agency theory was 
developed in order to offer solutions to the monitoring problem. In addition, the definition was 
also deemed relevant as it includes the issue of board members and the value they bring to a firm 
through their links with important resources. The following section contains an overview of the 
agency and resource dependence theories. 
 
2.2 Agency and resource dependence theories 
 
A number of theoretical perspectives may be used to explain corporate governance practices and 
problems (Rashid, 2011). Researchers seeking evidence of links between boards of directors and 
firm performance usually follow the two distinct paths of agency theory and resource 
dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Thus the researcher will focus primarily on 
agency and resource dependence as they are directly related to the research topic at hand. 
 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) proposed a theoretical model (see fig 2.1 below), in which both 
agency and resources dependence theories are combined. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that 
board capital positively influences both the functions of the board, namely, monitoring 
management and providing resources. As, regards board incentives, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
suggest that board dependence negatively affects the relationship between board capital and 
monitoring but positively affects the relationship between board capital and the provision of 
resources. In addition, they argue that board equity compensation positively affects both the 
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relationship between board capital and monitoring and the relationship between board capital and 
provision of the resources (Fig 2.1). 
Figure 2.1: Theoretical model 
 
 
Board incentives 
 Board dependence 
 Director compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board capital 
 Human capital 
 Relational capital 
 Monitoring activities – (agency theory)  
 Monitoring the CEO 
 Monitoring strategy 
implementation 
 Planning succession 
 Evaluating and rewarding the 
CEO/top managers. 
Firm 
Performance 
Provision of  resources activities (resource 
dependence theory) 
 Providing expertise 
 Administering advice and counsel 
 Facilitating access to capital 
 Building external relations 
 Diffusing innovation 
 Aiding in the formulation of 
strategy 
 Linking firm to important 
stakeholders or other entities 
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2.2.1 Agency theory 
The monitoring function of boards, also described as the “control” role (Boyd, 1990; Johnson, 
Daily, & Ellastrand, 1996), has attracted the attention of corporate governance researchers 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The monitoring function refers directly to the responsibility of 
directors to monitor managers on behalf of the shareholders (Rashid, 2011). The theoretical 
underpinning of the board’s monitoring function is derived from the agency theory, which 
describes the potential for conflicts of interest that may arise from the separation of ownership 
and control in organisations (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama et al. 1983). Advocates of the agency 
theory see the primary function of boards as that of monitoring the actions of managers (agents) 
in order to protect the interests of shareholders (principals) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mizruchi, 1983; 
Andreasson, 2011). On the other hand, legal and finance scholars emphasise the fiduciary 
responsibilities of directors to ensure that managers are acting in the interests of shareholders 
(Brainbridge, 1993; Miller, 1993).  
 
Monitoring by the board is important because of the potential costs which may be incurred 
should management pursue their own interests at the expenses of the shareholders’ interests 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Berle and Means (1932) assert that when ownership and control are 
separated, managers are able to pursue their self-interest at the expense of profit maximisation, 
thereby creating “agency” costs. Monitoring by boards of directors may reduce the agency costs 
inherent in the separation of ownership and control and, in this way, improve firm performance 
(Fama, 1980; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
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As regards the monitoring function/activities of directors as noted in Fig 2.1 above, scholars 
typically discuss a number of specific activities, including the monitoring of the CEO (Boyd, 
1995), monitoring the implementation of strategy (Rindova, 1999), planning the CEO’s 
succession (Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000), and evaluating and rewarding the CEO/executive 
managers of the firm (Conyon & Peck, 1998). Each of these activities has in common is the 
activity’s relationship to the monitoring function (Wu, 2003).  While the primary driver behind 
each of these activities is the obligation to ensure that management operates in the interest of 
shareholders. This obligation often encompasses the scrutiny, evaluation, and regulation of the 
actions of the executive management by the board (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
 
According to agency theory, the primary obstacle to the monitoring function is board incentives 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Agency theorists acknowledge that the incentives available to 
directors and boards as regards fulfilling their monitoring role in order to protect shareholder 
interests do vary and; thus, incentives are an important precursor to effective monitoring 
(Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). Agency theorists suggest that when incentives are 
aligned with shareholders' interests, the boards monitoring of management will be more 
effective, and thus, firm performance will improve (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Two alternatives for board incentives have figured prominently in agency theory research, 
namely, board dependence and director compensation (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Researchers 
studying the monitoring function have expressed a general preference for boards dominated by 
independent non-executive directors (Barnhart, Marr, & Rosenstein, 1994; Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Daily, 1995; Daily & Dalton, 1994a,b; Weisbach, 1988). These researchers contend that 
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boards which consist primarily of executive directors have less incentive to monitor management 
as a result of their dependence on the CEO/organisation (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). 
 
Agency scholars argue that dependence on the current CEO/organisation is an obstacle to both 
executive directors and dependent outsiders siding with the shareholders when their interests 
oppose those of management (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). However, it is thought that boards 
dominated by outside, non-affiliated directors, are better monitors because they lack this 
disincentive to monitor (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). A key hypothesis of this research study is 
that dependent boards will be less effective monitors and thus dependent boards will be 
negatively associated with firm performance. A meta-analysis of 54 studies of board dependence 
showed no significant statistical relationship between board incentives to monitor and firm 
performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998). 
 
The second obstacle to a board's monitoring performance that has received significant attention 
is equity compensation (Jensen, 1993). Equity compensation aligns the interests of shareholders 
and directors, thus motivating boards of directors to be better monitors (Elson, 1995). When 
boards do not directly share in the appreciation of the equity of the company, their incentives to 
uphold shareholder interests are diminished (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). The 
primary hypothesis states that board equity compensation will be positively associated with firm 
performance because of improved monitoring (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). However, while 
theoretically appealing, this hypothesis was not statistically supported in a recent meta-analysis 
(Dalton et al., 2003). 
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2.2.2 Resource dependence theory 
A second important board function is the provision of resources (Nicholson & Kiel 2007). This 
perspective represents the dominant perspective adopted by scholars
4
 in the resource dependence 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) and stakeholder traditions (Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). This board function refers directly to the ability of 
the board to bring resources to the firm with, resources being “anything that could be thought of 
as a strength or weakness of a given firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984, p.172).  
 
The theoretical underpinning of this function is based on the work conducted by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) on resource dependency. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p.163) note that “when an 
organisation appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the 
organisation, will concern himself with its problems, will variably present it to others, and will 
try to aid the organisation”. They assert that boards may offer the following four primary 
benefits, firstly, advice and counsel, secondly, legitimacy, thirdly, channels for communicating 
information between external organisations and the firm, and lastly, preferential access to 
commitments or support from important elements outside of the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, 
p.145,161). This view is primarily concerned with the board's provision of resources, defined 
broadly (Huse, 2007). 
 
Resource dependence logic suggests that a board's provision of resources is directly related to 
firm performance (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Resources help reduce the dependency between the 
                                                 
4
 These scholars include, Boyd  (1990); Daily and Dalton, (1994a,b); Gales and Kesner, (1994); Hillman, Cannella, 
and Paetzold, (2000); Pfeffer, (1972); Pfeffer and Salancik  (1978) 
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organisation and external contingencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), diminish uncertainty for the 
firm (Pfeffer, 1972), lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1984), and ultimately aid in the 
survival of the firm (Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). 
 
The provision of resources function of the board encompasses a variety of specific activities as 
also noted in (Fig 2.1 above), including but not limited to, providing legitimacy/bolstering the 
public image of the firm (Selznick, 1949), providing expertise, including the provision of internal 
firm information by executive directors (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990), administering advice 
and counsel (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mintzberg, 1983), linking the firm to important 
stakeholders or other important entities (Burt, 1980; Hillman et al., 2001), facilitating access to 
resources such as capital (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988), building external relations and diffusing 
innovation (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), and aiding in the formulation of strategy or other 
important firm decisions (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).  
 
The theoretical link between these various activities is the fact that they all focus on the board as 
a provider of resources, rather than as an evaluator of management (Huse, 2007). Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) propose two roles for directors in addition to the monitoring or control role, 
namely strategy and service. Johnson et al (1996) propose a slightly different terminology for the 
roles of directors, namely, the control, service, and resource dependency roles. Zahra and Pearce 
(1989, p.292) characterise the “service” role as “enhancing company reputation, establishing 
contacts with the external environment, and giving advice and counsel to executives”. They 
depict the “strategy” role as directors' active involvement “in the strategic arena through advice 
and counsel to the CEO, by initiating their own analyses, or by suggesting alternatives” (Zahra & 
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Pearce, 1989, p.298). on the other hand, Johnson et al.'s (1996, p.411) review of boards defines 
the “service” role as “directors advising the CEO and top managers on administrative and other 
managerial issues as well as more actively initiating and formulating strategy”, and the “resource 
dependence” role as directors “facilitating the acquisition of resources critical to the firm's 
success” and serving a legitimising function.  
 
According to the resource dependence theory, the primary obstacle to the board's provision of 
resources is board capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Board capital consists of both human 
capital (experience, expertise, and reputation) and relational capital (networking to other firms 
and external contingencies) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Board capital has been positively 
associated with the provision of each of the four benefits as discussed by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978). Firstly, board capital has been associated with the provision of advice and counsel, which 
Westphal (1999) linked to subsequent firm performance. Boards often include lawyers, financial 
representatives, top management of other firms, public affairs or marketing specialists, former 
government officials and community leaders, and also other directors who bring with them 
important expertise, experience, and skills to facilitate advice and counsel (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Gales & Kesner, 1994). 
 
Secondly, board capital has been linked to the establishment of firm legitimacy and reputation 
(Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992). Certo, Daily, and Dalton (2001) found 
that firms with more prestigious boards experienced better performance at their initial public 
offering. This in turn suggests that the prestige of directors (board capital) may enhance the 
credibility and performance of the firms they serve (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Pfeffer and 
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Salancik (1978, p.145) note that “prestigious or legitimate persons or organisations represented 
on the focal organisation's board provide confirmation to the rest of the world of the value and 
worth of the organisation”. While Bazerman and Schoorman (1983, p.211) state, “An 
organisation's reputation can be affected by who serves on the board of directors and to whom 
the organisation is seen to be linked”. Galaskiewicz (1985) argues that an executive's directorate 
ties similarly confer legitimacy and status on his/her home organisation. Thus, board human and 
relational capital may also enhance firm’s legitimacy and reputation, and this, in turn may 
improve firm performance. 
 
Thirdly, board capital provides channels of communication and conduits of information between 
the firm and external organisations (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) with board capital providing the 
firm with timely and valuable information. In addition, board capital serves to reduce the 
transaction costs of dealing with uncertainties in the environment, thereby enhancing 
performance (Huse, 2007). Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman (1999) found that when directors 
established connections with the United States government, shareholder value was positively 
affected. They concluded that such connections held the promise for information flow, more 
open communication, and/or potential influence with the government, a critical source of 
uncertainty for many firms (Hillman et al, 1999). 
 
Researchers have also found that interlocking directorates may play an important role in 
disseminating information across firms (Burt, 1980; Palmer, 1983; Useem, 1984), by reducing 
both vertical coordination and scanning costs (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983), and in serving as 
a mechanism for the diffusion of innovation (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). The external ties of 
  
29 
 
executive directors also facilitate access to strategic information and opportunities (Pfeffer, 
1991), enhance environmental scanning (Useem, 1984), and reveal information about the 
agendas and operations of other firms (Burt, 1983). Empirical evidence has shown that 
executives’ external ties play a critical role in future strategy formulation and subsequent firm 
performance (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Rosenstein & 
Wyatt (1994) have further shown that the shareholder value of a firm improves when the firm’s 
CEO is asked to join the board of another firm. 
 
Finally, board capital may be helpful in acquiring resources from important elements outside of 
the firm, for example, financial capital influence and influence with political bodies or other 
important stakeholder groups such as customers, suppliers, and communities (Boeker & 
Goodstein, 1991). Directorate ties enable firms to secure critical resources, often on more 
favourable terms than would otherwise have been the case (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; D'Aveni, 
1990; Zald, 1969). A study conducted by Pfeffer (1972), showed that firms with directorate ties 
to sectors in the environment which represented the most critical constraints outperformed their 
industry counterparts who lacked such external ties. 
 
2.3 The emergence of corporate governance reforms: - The King Reports 
 
The First King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) for South Africa, issued in November 
1994 was inspired by the Cadbury Committee Report on Corporate Governance (1992). King I 
offered to both South African companies and state-owned enterprises a coherent and disciplined 
governance framework which was relevant to local circumstances and practical in its guidance 
(Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). Unlike nearly all other similar initiatives globally, the King Committee 
  
30 
 
had no official mandate, and thus its recommendations are self-regulatory in nature (IOD, 1994) 
The King I report made an important contribution to the significant progress of South Africa as 
regards its inclusive model of corporate governance reform since the political transition in the 
mid-1990s (Rossouw, 2005; Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2002). The breadth and sophistication of 
these reform measures have placed South Africa in the top ranks of emerging market economies, 
and in some cases even alongside some of the more developed markets (Armstrong, 2004). 
The Second King Report on Corporate Governance (King II) for South Africa, issued in March 
2002 came about following an assessment of the developments that had taken place in the South 
African economy and in the global markets since 1994 (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2002) and, thus, 
King II was not driven by any major crisis in the corporate sector. However, coinciding with this 
review a number of crises did come to light, in both private and public sector companies, and 
these provided a stimulus to this second review (Armstrong, 2004).Compared to King I, King II 
acknowledges that there has been a move away from the single bottom line (i.e. profit to 
shareholders) to a triple bottom line, which embraces the economic, environmental and social 
aspects of a company’s activities (West, 2006). 
King II was designed to elaborate on the practices of good governance as required in law, 
although it was not intended to substitute or in any way to replace legal deficiencies in the South 
African systems (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2013). A particular emphasis in the King II was on the 
qualitative aspects of good corporate governance (Harrison, 2003). King II was not designed as a 
regulatory instrument but was in fact developed in order to identify core areas of good practice 
for boards, directors and companies, with these core areas extending beyond the existing legal 
and regulatory framework to embrace a number of aspirational issues (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). 
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The review reinforced guidelines which acknowledged the societal obligations of companies, 
indirectly emphasising the expectations of government and the wider community with respect to 
the contribution of the corporate sector to South Africa’s transition and development (Harrison, 
2003). In view of the difficulties involved in applying the guidelines throughout the entire South 
African economy, the guidelines contained in the King II focused primarily on the companies 
quoted on the JSE, banks and financial institutions, and public sector enterprises and agencies at 
the national and provincial levels (IOD, 2002).  
The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct which enshrines the core principles in King II 
addresses the following key components of corporate governance (IOD, 2002):  
Firstly the board of directors is identified as the focal point of the corporate governance system 
and is ultimately accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of the company 
(IOD, 2002). This in turn calls for a unitary board structure, which is common to countries which 
fall broadly-speaking under the Commonwealth system of law, and requires a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors on the board with a majority of the non-executive 
directors preferably independent of management (IOD, 2002). 
Secondly, independence is broadly defined, driven primarily by the more rigorous tests used by 
international investors, and was directed at the historically tight-knit nature of the South African 
business community and the need for boards to consider a wider pool of candidates. Thus, board 
independence, has given particular emphasis to issues of diversity, both in terms of gender and 
race, highlighted as a strategic imperative for companies wishing to remain relevant in the South 
African business environment (IOD, 2002). 
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Board independence has given rise to the need for a more effective induction process for 
directors as well as the ongoing development of directors to ensure that companies in both the 
private and public sectors remain competitive with effective boards and directors well versed in 
their duties and obligations. The Institute of Directors has been particularly prominent in 
instituting significant training programmes for inexperienced, as well as experienced, directors 
(IOD, 2002). 
Directors training programmes has led to the more sophisticated aspects of board governance 
coming into play with the requirement that directors and boards undergo regular evaluation, 
preferably conducted by an independent facilitator, in order to validate both board effectiveness 
and continuing suitability of individual directors standing for re-election (Armstrong, 2003). In 
view of the shortage of skills in the South African economy, it was not considered appropriate to 
prescribe age limits and constraints on the length of service on boards, although these are 
problems. However, it was felt that it would be difficult to address these problems in the light of 
the myriad of other demands facing boards in South Africa at the time (Harrison, 2003). 
Thirdly, while the size of boards was not regulated, the issue of size has drawn the attention of 
institutional investors and regulators with the result that a number of boards have seen fit to 
reduce their size to a more acceptable level in governance terms (Armstrong, 2003). The roles of 
chairman and CEO are required to be separate and this has since been reinforced by the JSE, 
banking and financial markets regulators, and regulations governing public sector companies. In 
addition, the position of chairman should be held by an independent non-executive director, and 
steps have been taken by a wide variety of companies to address this requirement (IOD, 2002). 
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Lastly, the IOD (2002), noted that the length of executive director service contracts is restricted 
to a maximum term of three years and should be the subject of shareholder confirmation if 
longer, while extensive disclosure of the remuneration and benefits of individual director 
(executive and non-executive) is now enforced by a number of the regulators. 
The Third King Report on Corporate Governance (King III) issued by the King committee in 
September 2009, became necessary because of both the new Companies Act, 2008 and changes 
in international governance trends (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr 2013). The existence of King III 
establishes the relevance of this research study within the South African context. King III is a 
report that builds on the pertinent issues raised by King I and King II. However it also addresses 
the inclusion of and renewed emphasis on issues such as sustainability, governance, the role and 
function of the audit committee, stakeholder relationship, compliance with laws and regulations 
and integrated reporting (Deloitte, 2009; IOD, 2009). By adopting an “apply or explain” 
approach, King III set an international benchmark (IOD, 2009; Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2013; 
IOD, 2012).  This approach means that entities need not to fully comply with King III when they, 
through an “application of the mind”, can justify their non-compliance (IOD, 2012). 
 
King III became effective on 1 March 2010 and it places the board of directors at the centre of 
the implementation of the corporate governance principles of public companies in South Africa 
(IOD, 2012). In addition King III notes that the board of directors should be responsible for the 
affairs of the company by determining the company’s strategic direction in a lawful and efficient 
manner in such a way as to ensure that the company is constantly improving its value creation 
and performance (IOD, 2009). The board should also ensure that the value being created is 
shared among the shareholders and employees with due regard to the interests of other 
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stakeholders (IOD, 2009) in order to carry out perform these responsibilities the board should 
inter alia, ensure the integrity of the financial controls and reports and also ensure that ethical 
standards are maintained and that the company complies with the laws of South Africa (IOD, 
2009). 
 
Principle 2.18 of the King III and S66 (2)(b) of the Companies Act 2008 recommends that the 
composition of the board of directors should include a balance of power, a mix of executive and 
independent non-executive directors, with a majority of independent non-executive directors 
(Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2013; IOD, 2012). King III further recommends that the board should 
be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of experience without compromising the 
integrity, compatibility, availability and independence of the board (IOD, 2012; Deloitte, 2013).  
 
The important aspect of King III that is relevant to this research study relates to 
recommendations that the board of directors comprise majority of independent non-executive 
directors. Both the King III Report on Corporate Governance (2009) and the Companies Act 
(2008) identify an independent non-executive director as a: director who is not a member of 
management (a non- executive director) and who is not a substantial shareholder of the company 
or an officer of or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a substantial shareholder of the 
company; has not within the last three years been employed in an executive capacity by the 
company or another group member or been a director after ceasing to hold any such 
employment; is not a principal of a professional adviser to the company or another group 
member; is not a significant supplier or customer of the company or another group member or an 
officer of or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a significant supplier or customer; 
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has no significant contractual relationship with the company or another group member other than 
as a director of the company; and is free from any interest and any business or other relationship 
which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability 
to act in the best interests of the company (IOD, 2009). 
 
King III states that the board of directors and in particular the independent non-executive 
directors play a central role in any corporate governance system and are viewed as a primary 
means for the shareholders to exercise control over the executive management (IOD, 2012). The 
standard approach in empirical finance and in modern global corporates involves viewing the 
board’s independence as closely related to both its efficiency and its effectiveness (Huse, 2007). 
In line with this reasoning, section 303A.01 of the New York Stock Exchange’s listed companies 
manual requires a majority of independent non-executive directors on the board (Rashid, 2011). 
Independent non-executive directors are viewed as superior monitors because their careers are 
not linked to the CEO of the firm and consequently they are free to take decisions that may go 
against the CEO without fear that they may be jeopardising their positions and future 
compensation (Huse, 2007). This view is often referred to as the monitoring effect theory which 
is advocated by agency theorists. Independent non-executive directors have incentives to build 
their reputations as expert monitors in order to obtain additional director appointments (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). Consequently, they are more likely to maintain proper control over a firm’s 
executive management team (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
Several papers have reported evidence supporting the notion of boards with a majority of 
independent non-executive directors as recommended by King III and the monitoring effect 
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(agency) theory. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994), show that the financial markets demonstrated a 
significant positive reaction following the announcement of independent non-executive board 
appointments in the Wall Street Journal. While Weisbach (1988), suggests that CEO turnover is 
more sensitive to performance in firms with independent non-executive dominated boards than it 
is in firms whose boards are dominated by executive directors. MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) 
found that board independence is positively correlated with accounting-based measures of firm 
performance, while Cotter et al. (1997) showed that boards who comprise a majority of 
independent non-executive directors receive higher returns as compared to similar firms without 
such a majority. Brickley et al. (1994) found a statistically positive and significant market 
reaction following the adoption of a poison pill clause when the board is dominated by a majority 
of independent non-executive directors. Beasley (1996) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) 
showed that a higher level of independent non-executive directors on the board decreases the 
likelihood of the firm’s financial statements containing fraudulent information; while, Klein 
(1998) found that companies with independent non-executive boards are less likely to manage 
their earnings by reporting abnormal accruals.  
 
On the other hand, Fosberg (1989) found that firms with a large percentage of independent non-
executive directors on their board are not characterised by better performance as measured by the 
firm’s ROE. The absence of any relation between the firm’s performance and the independence 
of its board members has also been confirmed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Klein (1998), 
and Bhagat & Black (2002) and more recently by Hayes, Mehran & Schaefer (2004). 
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2.4 Board composition and firm performance 
 
Board composition is measured in terms of different degrees of heterogeneity (Bhagat & Black, 
2002). Common assessments of board composition include executive and independent non-
executive director’s ratio, age and gender diversity among board members and board size 
(Rashid, 2011). There are inconclusive findings as regards the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance (Finegold, Benson & Hecht, 2007; Bermig & Frick, 2010; & 
Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh & Rudkin, 2010). There are several advantages to board heterogeneity 
as measured by a mix of executive and independent non-executive directors because of enhanced 
decision making arising from more information; although this would come at a considerable cost 
(Sanda et al 2011). It is in light of this that Eklund; Palmberg and Wiberg (2009) note that:  
 
Board heterogeneity is associated with a trade-off between increased costs in terms of 
longer decision time and lower external costs. That is, a trade-off between increased 
information efficiency associated with heterogeneous boards and decision efficiency 
associated with homogenous boards. Heterogeneous boards tend to be better informed 
regarding issues outside the firm and thereby better equipped to question and discuss 
corporate strategic decisions, whereas homogenous boards to a larger extent are based on 
trust, cooperation, as well as shared experience and values. 
 
In respect of composition in terms of the executive and independent non-executive director ratio, 
the agency theory is in favour of a majority of independent non-executive directors (Huse, 2007; 
Rashid, 2011). King III notes that, the board should include a balance of executive and non-
executive directors, with a majority of independent non-executive directors as this reduces the 
possibility of conflicts of interest (IOD, 2009). Executive directors serve in at least one of the 
following categories, namely management of the company or advisers to the company (Davidson 
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& Rowe, 2004). Sahin, Basfirinci and Ozsalih (2011) observe that previous literature does not 
contain consistent findings on the impact of proportion of executive and independent non-
executive director on financial performance. Pearce and Zahra (1992), Daily and Dalton (1993) 
and Krivogorsky, (2006) studies suggest that a positive relationship exists between executive and 
independent non-executive dominated boards and the performance of the company. However 
some studies have not found significant relationship between the proportion of executive and 
independent non-executive directors and firm performance (Bhagat & Black (1999), Daily & 
Johnson (1997) and Dulewicz & Herbert (2004). Finegold, Benson and Hecht (2007) note that: 
 
The many empirical studies that have examined the impact to the executive and 
independent non-executive ratio on boards have found no consistent evidence to suggest 
that increasing the percentage of outsiders on the board will enhance performance. If 
anything, they suggest that pushing too far to remove insider and affiliated directors may 
harm firm performance by depriving boards of the valuable firm and industry specific 
knowledge they provide. 
 
The argument challenging the role of independent non-executive directors is bases on the 
information asymmetry between executive directors and independent non-executive directors 
(Rashid, 2011). It is argued that executive directors live in the company they govern and thus, 
they have better understanding of the business than independent non-executive directors and are 
better able to make useful decision (Sanda et al. 2011). On the other hand, the independent non-
executive directors lack day to day inside knowledge of company and so they may play a 
reduced control role in the firm (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Rashid et al. 2010). 
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The arguments in favour of increasing the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
have been based on the agency theory in terms of which such outsider independent non-
executive directors are better able to protect the interest of the shareholders by fulfilling 
important monitoring functions (Bathala & Rao, 1995). It is argued that the executive directors 
are not be able to monitor the day-to-day activities of the managers effectively since that would 
mean that they would be monitoring their own operation and this would be operationally 
impracticable (Huse, 2007). 
 
However this debate will continue as there are no empirical findings to tilt the argument in any 
particular direction (Rashid, 2011). There are several explanations for the inconclusive results on 
this relationship between executive and independent non-executive directors and firm 
performance with one such explanations being that boards that are optimally weighted between 
insiders and outsiders would result in an insignificant relation (Wu, 2003). Another explanation 
is that simultaneity between key variables of interest confounds the interpretation of the results in 
studies that focus on a direct relation (Finegold et al. 2007). Yet another explanation is that 
performance and board characteristics, such as composition are jointly endogenous and thus, 
firm performance is a function not of past board independence only but, also a predictor of the 
future board structure (Panasian, Prevost & Bhabra, 2008). 
 
The literature on corporate governance tends to advocate expanding the independent/outsider 
elements in corporate boards (Sanda et al. 2011). Thus the literature
5
 indicates that board 
                                                 
5
 These literature include, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994); Weisbach (1988); MacAvoy and Millstein (1999); 
Krivogorsky (2006). 
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composition is in some way related to corporate performance. Panasian et al. (2008, p.136) 
remark that, “despite the inconclusive results of empirical literature on the effectiveness of 
outsider directors on the board, an international movement advocating greater board 
independence continues to strengthen”. 
 
2.5 Board size and firm performance 
 
A board of directors fulfils various functions (Solomon, 2010). While independent non-executive 
directors monitor the executive management and advise the CEO on the business strategy, 
executive directors convey information to the outsiders (Mace, 1971; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993). Much of the literature on board size has called for smaller boards (Wu, 2003). 
These arguments are based on the notion that smaller groups are more cohesive and more 
productive, and are able to monitor the firm more effectively than larger groups (Pablo, Valentin, 
Felix, 2005). On the other hand, larger groups are fraught with problems such as social loafing 
and higher co-ordination costs, and are thus not good monitors (Rashid, 2011). Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) argue that boards comprising eight or nine members are the most effective. 
According to them, when the board exceeds this optimal size, it becomes difficult for all the 
board members to express their ideas and opinions in the limited time available at board 
meetings. Jensen (1993) concurs with this view and states those boards of more than seven or 
eight members function less effectively and are easier for the CEO to control than smaller 
boards. Yermack (1996) provides empirical support for these arguments by showing a significant 
negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and board size for large United States public firms. 
 
There are, however, certain advantages to larger boards (Wu, 2003). From an agency 
perspective, it may be argued that a larger board is more likely to be vigilant as regards agency 
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problems simply because a greater number of people will be reviewing management actions 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). Mak and Li (2001) showed a significant and positive correlation 
between Tobin’s Q and board size for Singapore firms in OLS regression.  However, agency 
theorists recognise that there is an upper limit to boards (Huse, 2007). Jensen (1993) suggests 
this limit to be approximately eight directors, as a greater number would interfere with group 
dynamics and inhibit board performance. Alternatively, it may be argued that it is not the size of 
the board, that is critical, but rather the number of independent non-executive members on the 
board (Dalton, et al., 1999). 
 
From a resource dependence theory perspective, it may similarly be argued that a larger board 
offer greater opportunities for more external linkages and hence access to resources (Nicholson 
& Kiel, 2003). Nicholson and Kiel (2003) note the existence of a variety of studies that argue 
that boards link a firm to the external environment to secure resources
6
. According to these 
studies, one of the functions of directors is to provide assistance in obtaining resources from 
outside of the firm (Nicholson & Kiel 2003). Pfeffer (1972) suggests that the need for external 
resources such as debt finance would increase the CEO’s need for advice and, thus the size of the 
board of such a firm would probably increase. For example, Booth and Deli (1999) found that 
firms that require more debt financing are more likely to have a commercial banker on the board 
as compared to firms requiring less debt financing. Similarly, Ferris, Hagannathan and Pritchard 
(2000), found a positive and significant correlation between log (board size in 1995) and ratio of 
market to book value for firms requiring debt financing. 
 
                                                 
6
 These studies include, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978); Klein (1998); and Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000). 
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Dalton et al (1999), maintain that larger boards may offer an exceptional level of high quality 
advice and counsel to the CEO. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) suggest that independent non-
executive directors serve as potential sources of counsel and add expertise and experience to the 
board, while Lorsch and McIver (1989) similarly, note that directors consider that one of their 
key duties during normal times is to advise the CEO. In fact, Adams and Mehran (2003) 
documents that boards devote significant resources up to 52% of total director meetings to 
activities that are not traditionally considered to be monitoring activities.  
 
Further evidence of the advisory role of outside directors is provided by Adams and Mehran 
(2003). They found that as the number of states in which a bank has operations increases, the 
board size increases, perhaps to accommodate representatives of the subsidiaries from different 
states (Adam & Mehran, 2003). Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) found that firms that require more 
political advice have a higher proportion of outsiders with political connections on their board. It 
is therefore, likely that while smaller boards are more effective at monitoring, board size will 
increase as the firm’s advising requirements grow (Agrawal et al. 2001).  
 
Yermack (1996) suggests that the CEOs of diversified firms may require higher levels of advice, 
as compared to less diversified firms and that the need for advice may increase with the number 
of business segments. Thus, in diversified firms, the board should be large enough to 
accommodate independent non-executive with backgrounds matching the disparate business 
interests of the firm, and who will be able to advise the CEO on investment opportunities 
(Yermack, 1996). Yermack (1996) reports a strong inverse relationship between board size and 
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firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. Bhagat and Black (2002), also reports an inverse 
correlation found by Yermack (1996) for large United States public firms. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
Chapter 2 discussed issues found in the literature relevant to the research study, namely, an 
overview of corporate governance, the agency and resource dependence theories of corporate 
governance, corporate governance reforms and the King Reports and the link between the 
composition and size of the board and firm performance. Each of these contributes to an 
understanding of corporate governance in general, and the nature of a board of directors in 
particular. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology used in the study. 
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Chapter III: Research Methodology and Data                                                                                                  
 
3.1Research purpose and research hypothesis 
                                                  
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of board composition and board size on the 
economic performance of firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa. 
 
The following research hypothesis was formulated and tested in this study: 
As regards board composition, the agency theory suggests that a greater proportion of 
independent non-executive directors compared to executive directors are able to monitor any 
self-interested actions on the part of managers and so minimise the agency costs and enhance 
firm performance (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
H0: There is an insignificant positive relationship between board composition (proportion of 
outside independent directors) and firm performance in South Africa. 
 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between board composition (proportion of outside 
independent directors) and firm performance in South Africa. 
 
It is acknowledged internationally that board size and firm size are correlated (Dalton et al., 
1999; Yermack, 1996). This finding may be explained in terms of at least two of the prevailing 
governance theories. From an agency perspective, larger companies require a greater number of 
directors in order to monitor and control a firm’s activities (Yermack, 1996). While from a 
resource dependence perspective, larger and diversified companies require access to a greater 
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range of resources and thus, such firms will appoint more directors to provide access to those 
resources (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). Consequently, the researcher would expect either: 
 
H0: Board size is not positively correlated with firm performance. 
 
H1: Board size is positively correlated with firm performance. 
 
3.2 Overview of research method 
 
In the area of both business and management, qualitative and quantitative methods are the 
methods selected for research data analysis (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Data and methodology are 
inextricably intertwined and for this reason, it is essential that the methodology used in the 
context of a particular research problem always take into account the nature of the data that will 
be collected in order to resolve the problem (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Bryman and Bell (2007, 
p.45) noted that “quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy that emphasizes 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data”. According to Trochim (2006), quantitative 
methods are numerical in form and encompass the confirmatory and deductive approach. During 
this research study, the researcher used published annual reports as the main source of data and 
used statistical analysis in order to draw the research conclusion. Leedy & Ormrod (2010) further 
note that data dictates the research method. 
 
Thus, the study adopted a quantitative approach and used multiple regression analysis (MRA) 
and analysis of variance (ANOVA) as the primary statistical techniques. This research study may 
be classified as an empirical study and was concerned with establishing the relationships 
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between variables (Ryan, Scapens & Theobald, 2002). The variables considered in empirical 
research may be dichotomised as dependent and independent variables. The independent 
variables in an experiment are the variables that are manipulated by the researcher; they are in 
effect the variables that are being studied. The dependent variables measure the response to the 
manipulation of the independent variables. Thus in an experiment the researcher is interested in 
determining the impact of the changes in the independent variable upon the dependent variable. 
The study adopted the quantitative research approach as the study focused on the amounts of one 
or more variables of interest (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).                                                                                       
3.2.1 Independent variable 
In line with studies conducted in the United States of America (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Coles, 
McWilliams & Sen, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 1993) the researcher employed two measures of 
board composition/demographics for the purposes of this study. Firstly, the researcher calculated 
the size of each board contained in the dataset. Secondly, when collecting the data the researcher 
classified each director as either an executive (inside) director or an independent non-executive 
(outside) director. This, in turn allowed the researcher to calculate the percentage of outsiders on 
each board. However, the researcher acknowledged that this did not allow for the calculation and 
the presence of “grey/affiliated” directors. For the purpose of this study board composition was 
defined as the percentage of independent non-executive directors who were members of the 
board (Rashid et al. 2010). This satisfied the requirements contained in the definition of board 
composition as stipulated in the King III Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance of 
Public Companies in South Africa (2009). On the other hand, board size refers to the number of 
members serving on a firm’s board. 
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3.2.2 Dependent variables 
While there are many measures of firm performance for example stakeholder satisfaction and 
intellectual capital (Clarkson, 1995), the researcher in this study followed the approach adopted 
by Bhagat and Black (2002) and Nicholson and Kiel (2003) by using three financial measures of 
firm performance, namely Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The 
financial measures of a firm’s financial performance may be classified into two key categories, 
namely, accounting based measures and market based measures (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). 
 
Accounting based measures of performance are historical and thus, are characterised by a more 
backward and inward looking focus (Cochrane & Wood, 1984) Developed as a reporting 
mechanism, accounting based measures take into account the impact of numerous factors 
including the past successes of advice given by the board to the executive management team and 
are the traditional mainstay of corporate performance measures (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). 
Examples of these measures which are used in the governance literature include return on assets 
(Cochran & Wood, 1984; Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994), earnings per share (Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992), and return on equity (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). In general, however, the major 
concern with accounting measures is that they are historical and thus they lag behind the actual 
actions that bring about results (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). 
 
In contrast, market based measures of a firm’s performance relate to the overall value ascribed to 
the firm by the market (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). Such measures may not bear any relationship 
to asset valuations, current operations or even the firm’s historical profitability (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). These market based measures emphasise the expected future earnings of the 
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firm and, thus, they are considered a forward-looking indicator that reflect current plans and 
strategies. Measures in this category include market to book ratio, Tobin’s Q (Barnhart et al. 
1994) or constructed indices such as the Sharpe measure (Hoskisson et al., 1994). 
 
In view of the strong market efficiency in South Africa (Armstrong, 2004), the researcher 
followed the lead of Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Nicholson 
and Kiel (2003) in using Tobin’s Q. in terms of the assumption of a strong market, any positive 
impacts of board demographics/composition would be readily apparent to the market participants 
and, thus, they would be reflected in the market capitalisation of the firm (Fama, 1998). 
 
This study used both accounting and market-based measures: As regards the profitability of a 
firm’s assets in terms of generating revenue, net return on assets (ROA) managed was calculated 
as the ratio of net profit to total assets. While, in order to measure a firm’s efficiency in using 
investment funds to create increased earnings, return on equity (ROE) was calculated as the ratio 
of net profit to equity. Finally as a market based variable, Tobin’s Q was calculated. In line with 
study conducted by Bhagat and Black (2002), Tobin Q was denoted as follows: 
 
Tobin’s Q = (Market Value (Equity) + Book Value (Assets) – Book Value (Equity))/ Book 
Value (Assets)  
3.2.3 Control variables 
Statistical predictions may often be improved by the use of more than one independent variable 
(Van Staden, 1998). Thus, by using control variables in addition to the independent variable, the 
predictive values of the multiple regression models are increased. The regression results 
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controlled for a number of factors that could have affected firm performance, board composition 
or both. The researcher used a number of control variables, including firm size, firm age, market 
capitalisation and growth as recommended in the study by Bhagat and Black (2002). 
 
3.2.4 Regression model specification  
In order to examine the relationship between board composition and firm performance, the 
following MRA model was developed:  
 
Yi,t=α+β1BDCOMPi,t+β2BDSIZEi,t+β3AGEi,t+β4SIZE1i,t+β5SIZE2i,t+β6GROWTHi,t+εi,t  
 
Where, Yi,t represents firm performance variables; ROAi,t,  ROEi,t, and Tobin’s Qi,t are for 
firm i in time t. BDCOMPi,t is the board composition (exec vs. non exec directors), BDSIZEi,t is 
the board size, and AGEi,t is the firm age. SIZE1i,t and SIZE2i,t represents the firm size 
measured by revenue and market capitalisation, GROWTHi,t is the firm’s growth as represented 
by the changes in sales, α is the intercept, β is the regression coefficient and ε is the error term. 
 
MRA is a statistical technique which is used for modelling the relationship between variables. 
However, it does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 
2006). The result of MRA is an equation that represents the best prediction of a dependent 
variable from several independent variables (Coakes & Steed, 2001). There are three major 
regression models, namely, standard or simultaneous regression, hierarchical regression, and 
stepwise regression. In the standard or simultaneous regression, all the independent variables 
enter the regression equation at once because the aim is to examine the entire set of predictors 
and also the dependent variable. In hierarchical multiple regression, the order of entry of the 
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independent variables is determined based on theoretical knowledge while, in stepwise 
regression, the number of independent variables and the order of entry are determined by 
statistical criteria generated by the stepwise procedure. The choice of technique depends 
primarily on the researcher’s goals (Coakes & Steed, 2001). The standard or simultaneous model 
was employed for the purpose of this study as the objective of the study was to examine the 
effect of all the predictors on the dependent variable. 
 
Accordingly, the multiple regression models were be tested for both validity and adequacy using 
statistical tools such as hypothesis testing using the classical approach, ANOVA analysis, and 
the coefficient of determination (R²). Finally, based on the regression models derived, 
conclusions were drawn as to whether there was a significant positive relationship between board 
composition and size and firm performance. 
 
However, there are four assumptions that have to be met in order to draw inferences from a 
regression model. According to Sheather (2009), these include the following, firstly, there must 
be a linear relationship between the dependent variable/s (Y1…n) and the independent variable/s 
(X1…n); secondly, the errors must be independent of each other; thirdly, the errors must have a 
common variance (homoscedacicity); and finally, the errors must be normally distributed with a 
mean of 0. 
 
In order to ensure the linearity of data by limiting the effect of both outliers and leverage points, 
the variables Tobin’s Q was transformed into its natural logarithm form. The transformation of 
certain variables was necessary as this ensured that the error of variances became constant 
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(Sheather, 2009). The llinearity of the dependent and independent variables was tested by 
observing scattergrams of standardised residuals against the predicted values. A non-discernible 
pattern in the plots of the residuals would indicate that the models were valid.  
 
In order to address the problem of the data collected from one year to the other becoming serially 
correlated, also termed autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated in SPSS was 
observed as autocorrelation would have violated the assumption of the independence of errors. 
The values of the Durbin-Watson statistic range from 0 to 4 and as a general rule, the residuals 
are uncorrelated if the value is approximately 2, with a value close to 0 indicating a strong 
negative correlation and a value of 4 indicating strong positive correlation. 
 
Another critical assumption of regression analysis is that the errors must have constant variance 
otherwise all the inferential statistics such as p-values, confidence intervals and prediction 
intervals are rendered invalid (Sheather, 2009). The violation of this assumption is referred to as 
the heterogeneity of variance or heteroscedasticity (Gamst, Meyers, & Guarino, 2008). It is 
however, possible to overcome the problem by using methods such the transformation of data in 
terms of which certain variables are transformed into their square root or natural logarithm 
forms. In order to test for homoscedasticity, a scatterplot of the standardised residuals was 
plotted against the firm performance variables. Any pattern formed by the plots would have 
indicated the existence of heteroscedasticity.    
 
The normality of errors was tested by using a normal probability plot (P-P) of the standardised 
residuals and histograms of the residuals. Plots in an approximate straight line are assumed to be 
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evidence of data consistent with that from a normal distribution. A histogram is a conventional 
solution for the display of interval-ratio data (Cooper & Schindler, 2001) and is used when it is 
possible to group variable values into intervals. Histograms are constructed using bars with each 
value occupying an equal amount of area within an enclosed area. Histograms are useful both for 
displaying all the intervals in a distribution and for examining the shape and distribution for 
skewness, kurtosis and the modal pattern (Cooper & Schindler, 2001). In the case of a histogram, 
the empirical distribution of the data should be bell-shaped and resemble the normal distribution. 
 
Lastly, multicollinearity was assured by firstly conducting, the correlation coefficient calculation 
in Excel, secondly by variance inflation factors (VIFs) and lastly by computing the Eigen Value 
Collinearity both in SPSS. Multicollinearity is a situation which arises in regression analysis 
when strong correlations exist between the independent variables. This may result in incorrect 
regression coefficient signs and statistically insignificant independent variables despite the fact 
that the F-test may be highly significant. The acceptable cut-off point often used in practice is 5 
(Sheather, 2009) as any VIF above 5 is indicative of a strong correlation between the respective 
variable with this, in turn leading to poorly estimated regression coefficients (Sheather, 2009).   
 
Regression analysis (hypothesis testing) was conducted through SPSS. SPSS provided the 
following two important regression analysis reports: 
1. Model summary; 
2. Coefficients. 
The model summary consists of R, R², adjusted R² and the standard error of the estimate. For the 
purposes of this research study R² was used as the tool with which to test the internal validity of 
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the research study. The internal validity of an experiment is determined by the degree of control 
that has been achieved in the study. In other words, the greater the control achieved, the higher 
the internal validity (Ryan et al. 2002). When a study is described as possessing a high internal 
validity, this is understood to mean that the changes in the dependent variable have been brought 
about, in the main by changes in the nature of the independent variable (Ryan et al. 2002). The 
correlation of determination (R²) is considered to be one of the preferred statistical tests for this 
purpose. 
 
Firstly, the coefficient of determination is determined by squaring the coefficient of correlation 
(Julyan & Nel, 2003). For example, if R² is around 80% this should be interpreted to mean that 
80% of the change in the dependent variable may be explained by the independent variables 
while 20% of the change in the dependent variable is caused by factors other than the 
independent variables which were used. 
 
Secondly the t-test may be used. This test measures the statistical significance of each of the 
regression coefficients, and must be read in conjunction with levels of significance measured as a 
probability value (ρ-value). The t-test also indicates the direction of the relationship between 
variables with a positive t-test indicating a positive relationship and a negative t-test indicating a 
negative relationship. The ρ-value refers to the probability of observing a sample value as 
extreme as, or more extreme than, the actual value observed, given that the null hypothesis is 
true. The ρ-value is compared to the level of significance determined above and on this basis the 
null hypothesis is either rejected or not rejected. If the ρ < 0.05 (significance level), the null 
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hypothesis is rejected while if ρ > 0.05 (significance level), the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
SPSS compute the ρ-value during the execution of the hypothesis test. 
 
The alternative hypothesis holds that there is a relationship between variables. In other words, for 
the purpose of this study, there is a relationship between board composition and firm 
performance. The objective of this research study was to establish whether there is a relationship 
between board composition and firm performance. As a result of the conceptual framework 
adopted in the study and in line with the hypotheses were formulated, this relationship must be 
positive. Accordingly, a one-tailed test or directional test was be used. This directional test was a 
right one-tailed test in order to minimise the possibility of a type II error. This, in turn means that 
the t-statistic calculated must be positive and significant (t is > zero). If it is negative (t< 0) the 
null hypothesis will not be rejected. 
 
3.3 Population and study sample 
  
According to Thomas, Burnham and Buckland (2004, p.105), a population may be defined as the 
total set of elements in which the researcher is interested. The size of the population usually 
renders it both impractical and uneconomical to involve all members of the population in a 
research project (Welman & Kruger, 2001). Accordingly, samples are drawn for investigation. 
Defining the population that is to be studied is an important prelude to drawing samples from it 
(Thomas et al. 2004). Thus, the research objectives and scope of the study are critical in defining 
the target population that will be studied (Hair, Bush & Ortinau, 2003).  
 
Based on the population which has been defined it is then necessary to define the sampling frame 
as “the sampling frame provides a working definition of the target population” (Hair et al, 2003, 
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p.211). The sampling frame takes into account practical issues relating to the availability of 
information. An accurate sampling frame is extremely important as it helps to reduce bias and to 
ensure that the sample used truly represents the population from which it is taken (Zikmund, 
2003). For the purpose of this study the sample frame was defined as all JSE listed companies 
with the results of the operations of these companies for the 2006 to 2012 financial years being 
used in the study.  
 
3.4 Sample size and selection of sample  
 
Of the total companies (1861) listed on the JSE from 2006 to 2012 and found on the OSIRS 
financial database, the researcher used all the companies from across all industrial sectors and 
listed on the JSE from 2006 to 2012.  
 
3.5 Data sources   
 
In view of the difficulty involved in acquiring information from private companies, it was 
decided to limit the study to public companies that are listed on the JSE Securities Exchange. For 
the purposes of this study, the extent of firm performance was measured using the statutory 
annual reports. Thus, the data used in the study was collected from the published annual reports 
of companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange from the 2006 to 2012 fiscal years. The 
primary source of information for the study was the secondary database from OSIRIS, which 
supplies both real-time and historical fundamental information on South African listed 
companies.  
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3.6 Collection of data 
  
The data was sourced from the published annual reports on each company’s website and was 
downloaded from the OSIRIS financial database directly into Microsoft Excel. The data was 
collected in May and analysed from June 2013 with the first research report draft being ready at 
the end of December 2013.     
 
3.7 Data management  
 
The data collected from the OSRIS financial database was downloaded in Excel workbooks 
containing seven worksheets each representing a financial year end. These workbooks were 
managed by storing them on a laptop and backing them up on an external hard drive.                                   
 
3.8 Data analysis 
  
Data is of little or no value merely as data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Thus, data analysis is an 
essential element in an empirical research. The process of data analysis may take takes several 
forms, depending on the nature of the research question and research design, and on the nature of 
the data itself (Bless, 2006). This study encompassed an empirical research design and thus 
quantitative primary data was collected for the purpose of the study. The data analysis tools 
which were deemed to be the most appropriate for the study were statistical analysis techniques 
using SPSS statistical software package. The most common of these statistical analysis 
techniques are descriptive statistical tools and inferential statistical tools.  
 
Descriptive statistics are statistics which are used to describe or summarise information about a 
population or sample (Zikmund, 2003). Descriptive statistics uses a wide range of techniques to 
describe the sample being investigated. The techniques employed include standard deviation 
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correlations, factor analysis and frequency counts with each technique extracting a somewhat 
different meaning from a set of data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). On the other hand, inferential 
statistics enable the researcher to make inferences or predictions about large populations by 
using the data collected, from observation and analysis on a relatively small sample (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2010).  
 
The statistical analysis in the study was conducted by a statistical consultant at the University of 
the Witwatersrand. A descriptive analysis was conducted using basic frequency tabulations with 
measures of central tendency and dispersion such as means, standard deviations and ranges and 
graphic material in the form of histograms, normal P-P plots and scattergrams to describe the 
sample. For inferential statistics, the study used the multiple regression analysis to evaluate the 
relationships between these measures of firm performance and board composition. 
 
Both parametric (where data is transformed) and non-parametric (where data in not transformed) 
methodology was employed. The multiple regression models was run using the standard or 
simultaneous model, as the objective of the research study was to examine the effect of all the 
predictors on the dependent variable. For the purpose of this study various options of multiple 
regressions were run, including fixed effects, random effects, ordinary least squares (OLS), 
generalised least squares (GLS) and a dynamic panel. The most robust of all was the OLS and, 
thus, the tables below present the results of the OLS regression. 
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3.9 Validity and reliability 
3.9.1 Validity 
Validity encompasses both external and internal validity (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). According to 
Bryman and Bell (2007) validity is an important criterion in research and “validity is concerned 
with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research”. Thus, validity 
refers to whether the researcher is observing, identifying, or measuring data which coincides 
with what he/she should do (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2007), there are four types of validity, namely, measurement 
validity, internal validity, external validity and ecological validity. Measurement validity relates 
to the issue of whether or not an indicator that has been devised to estimate a concept does, in 
fact, measure that concept while internal validity relates to whether a conclusion which has been 
drawn incorporates a causal relationship between two or more variables (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
On the other hand, external validity refers to whether it is possible to generalise an outcome of a 
specific beyond the specific research and, finally, ecological validity is concerned with social 
environment, social settings and people’s routine life (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
 
As regards this study, the researcher focused primarily on measurement validity in terms of using 
different control variables and endeavoured to examine whether each control variable was able to 
reflect an association with firm performance. However, the internal validity was reflected in the 
correlation test between different variables in order to examine the relationship between them. 
Thus, various regression diagnostics including a, test for normality, heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity were carried out to enhance internal validity of the regression model. The 
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researcher is of the opinion that the data was valid. All data used was extracted from the audited 
and published annual reports of the companies and these reports are characterised by a high level 
of both credibility and accountability. 
3.9.2 Reliability 
Reliability involves whether the results of a study are repeatable, and it is particularly relevant in 
quantitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2007). All the data for the purposes of this study was 
collected from audited published annual reports, and the researcher was sure this would ensure in 
a high level of reliability. The regression model used had been tested by prior researchers and 
was deemed a mature model. The use of SPSS statistical software package ensured that the 
processing of the data was accurate, controllable and reliable. Thus, the researcher is convinced 
of the transparency, relevance and reliability for this dissertation.  
 
3.10 Assumptions and delimitations of the study 
3.10.1 Assumptions  
It was assumed that the total number of firms included in the sample was sufficient to ensure 
adequate data on corporate financial reporting and performance and also that the corporate 
governance information was communicated candidly and truthfully by the firms. False data 
would have had a detrimental effect on the study’s results.  
 
3.10.2 Delimitations 
The study used public listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange only and focused 
on the Code of Governance Principles for South Africa 2009. Thus, detailed data on the budgets 
and forecasts of specific business units was not discussed. 
 
  
60 
 
3.11 Summary 
 
The objective of this research study was to establish whether board composition and board size is 
associated with, or is able to explain firm performance. Thus, using statistical terminology, the 
aim of the research study was to explain or predict a dependent variable (firm performance) from 
a set of independent variables (board composition and board size) and control factors. Multiple 
regression analysis was selected for this purpose. Regression results provide information on the 
statistical significance of the independent variables, the strength of the association between one 
or more of the predictors, and a predictive equation for future use. The information provided by 
the regression analysis clearly enabled the aims and objectives of this research study to be 
realised. The next chapter discusses the results of the OLS regression models. This is followed by a 
summary and conclusion of the research study.  
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Chapter IV: Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to explore, display and examine the data which was collected. 
The chapter discusses the descriptive statistics applied to the primary variables, describes the 
statistical results of the multiple regression analysis conducted for each firm performance 
variable and determines whether the hypotheses are to be accepted or rejected. The regression 
equations were tested at a 5% confidence level. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarise information about a population (Zikmund, 2003) by 
conveying more precise information about the behaviour of the random variables through the 
measures of central location (mean and median) and dispersion (standard deviation and range) 
(Wegner, 2001). These measures reduce huge volumes of data to a simpler format to enable the 
understanding of a population sample.  
 
The first King Report (1994) (King I) was instrumental in raising the awareness of what 
constitutes good governance, both in the private and public sectors (Malherbe & Segal, 2001). 
The report offered to both companies and state-owned enterprises, for the first time, a coherent 
and disciplined governance framework that was relevant to local circumstances and which 
offered practical guidance (Armstrong, 2004). The listing requirements of the former 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), now known as the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, 
were comprehensively revised, first in 1995 and again in 2000, to incorporate both King I and II 
recommendations on Corporate Governance in order to ensure that rules governing companies 
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listed and to be listed on JSE remained in line with international best practice. It is evident from 
Figure 4.1 below that the majority of the companies were listed between 1994 and 2007 with 
more than 60% being incorporated in 1998 following the release of King I & II reports. 
 
Figure 4.1: Date of incorporation/listing on JSE 
 
The researcher identified the following Financial Times (FT) industrial classes which are in line 
with the classification as noted in the manual guideline of the StatsSA (2012): 
 Agriculture & Fishing 
 Construction 
 Diversified Holding Companies 
 Financial Services & Real Estate 
 Health Care 
 Hotels & Restaurants 
 Manufacturing 
 Mining and Extracting industries 
 Telecommunications & Electronics 
 Transport Services 
 Wholesale & Retail Trade 
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Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1 below depicts the bar graph and a total sample of 1861 for the 11 
industrial classes of firms listed on the JSE from 2006 to 2012. Financial Services and Real 
Estate comprise 29% of the total sample, thus clearly showing the significant influence of these 
two industries on the South African capital markets. This is followed by the Manufacturing and 
Telecommunications and Electronics industries at 14% respectively. Agriculture and the 
Transport Services industry are the lowest ranked in the sample representing 1% of the total 
sample only. 
Figure 4.2: Financial Times (FT) industrial class 
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Table 4.2 and Table 4.7 below depict that the mean percentage of independent non-executive 
directors on the boards of directors of South African companies listed on the JSE Securities 
Exchange before King III was 50% while, after King III this figure went up to 53% with a 
median of 57%. These results are consistent with findings of Vafas and Theodorou (1998) who 
reported that of the 250 publicly listed firms surveyed, the percentages of independent non-
executive and executive directors on the boards of directors were 61% and 39% respectively. 
Mitchell Williams (2000) observed that the representation of independent non-executive and 
executive directors on the boards of South African publicly listed companies was evenly divided. 
However, it should be noted that this research study was conducted after the implementation of 
King III and that King III recommends for a greater percentage of independent non-executive 
directors on a board of directors than executive directors (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2013). 
 
Of all the firms included in this study Table 4.7 below depicts that, the mean board size was 
approximately 12.87 before King III, rising marginally to 13.54 after King III, thus, suggesting 
that the boards of firms in South Africa are of a relatively larger size. With a maximum board 
size of 24 and a standard deviation average of 4, it is clear that the boards of firms in South 
Africa are of a relatively similar large size. According to researchers such as Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) and Burt (1980) large boards are essentially good for firm performance as they argue that 
large board sizes are associated with positive corporate performance. Table 4.7 shows that, the 
mean company age was 39 years before King III but relatively lower after King III at 36 years. 
 
The findings of the descriptive research study confirm both agency and resource dependence 
theory in supporting the proposition that independent non-executive directors have a significant 
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impact on firm performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wang & Dewhirst, 1992). Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1994) found that the addition of an independent non-executive director to the board 
of directors resulted in the company’s earning a positive excess return. This, in turn suggests that 
the shareholders of a company view the appointment of a non-executive director as possessing 
intrinsic value. The descriptive statistics explain the findings of the study that there were a 
greater percentage of independent non-executive directors on the boards of South African 
companies listed on the JSE for the 2006 to 2012 fiscal years as compared to the percentage of 
executive directors, thus, complying with King III recommendations on board composition. 
Table 4.1:  Between-subjects factors 
 
Value Label N 
Year (King) 
1.00 2006 171 
2.00 2007 271 
3.00 2008 295 
4.00 2009 283 
5.00 2011 270 
6.00 2012 300 
7.00 2010 271 
FT Industry Class (M) 
AGRICULTURE & FISHING 
 
29 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
140 
DIVERSIFIED HOLDING COMPANIES 
 
81 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND REAL 
ESTATE 
 
415 
HEALTH CARE 
 
67 
HOTELS AND RESTAURENTS 
 
62 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
 
297 
MINING & EXTRACTING INDUSTRIES 
 
250 
TELECOMMUNICATION AND 
ELECTRONICS 
 
279 
TRANSPORT SERVICES 
 
32 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE 
 
209 
Listed/unlisted/delisted 
Delisted 
 
136 
Listed 
 
1725 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics 
 Year N Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness 
Operating Rev./Turnover th 
LCU 
2006 316 4887385.17 529080.00 13630991.364 0 163903000 63.330 6.689 
2007 335 5085360.83 651267.00 12281862.261 0 99171000 24.760 4.492 
2008 348 6133760.60 773257.00 14888322.426 0 130578000 27.305 4.638 
2009 341 6404616.87 845948.00 15638346.010 0 138857000 28.503 4.737 
2010 326 6557242.72 941757.50 15580301.154 0 123110000 24.497 4.448 
2011 322 7630414.30 1029317.00 17420692.997 -84900 143524000 23.565 4.316 
2012 300 12278419.31 1899239.50 26939581.826 -78000 170862000 16.877 3.846 
Total 2084 6401111.05 837608.00 15790442.496 -84900 170862000 31.451 4.916 
Total Assets th LCU 2006 323 16660893.18 747321.00 81365792.051 141 968455000 74.098 7.979 
2007 342 18671935.98 975851.00 95956198.284 113 1182126000 81.494 8.409 
2008 355 20715914.82 1038929.00 113462711.527 78 1503653000 99.893 9.302 
2009 348 20361506.18 1210693.50 104624458.605 0 1292506000 83.229 8.564 
2010 336 22299380.94 1220426.00 110677557.280 0 1332409000 77.570 8.242 
2011 333 24743629.78 1461863.00 118436716.027 44 1492829000 84.881 8.460 
2012 331 22660531.58 2359736.00 85717817.382 34392 769765000 60.971 7.367 
Total 2136 20684849.18 1153385.50 104065671.225 0 1503653000 88.814 8.694 
Shareholders Funds th LCU 2006 323 2803046.34 305770.00 7669422.734 -647087 54708000 19.968 4.295 
2007 342 3094035.13 401975.00 8793882.461 -686027 68506000 24.477 4.727 
2008 355 3594024.28 459942.00 10613789.139 -794067 99501000 34.600 5.416 
2009 348 3836203.45 501168.50 10879132.946 -36567 99369000 32.925 5.281 
2010 336 4270336.90 551578.50 11962981.551 -744500 103198000 30.221 5.093 
2011 333 4990397.12 693734.00 13638596.466 -28132 117533000 30.484 5.071 
2012 312 6879785.38 976674.00 17061873.834 -72797 125234000 25.549 4.569 
Total 2136 3910185.20 503184.50 11171479.571 -794067 125234000 35.743 5.379 
Net Income th LCU 2006 323 648033.80 60049.00 1976384.840 -525000 19169000 34.409 5.320 
2007 342 721691.36 84593.50 2096627.530 -1405500 17030000 27.412 4.858 
2008 355 830006.00 58696.00 3375858.444 -1730790 45330000 93.779 8.500 
2009 348 614444.56 47102.50 2570409.139 -1507218 37458000 127.072 9.908 
2010 334 636993.78 54195.50 2120918.515 -8676000 15941000 25.037 4.283 
2011 332 844533.46 63224.00 2776010.519 -1972973 21527000 29.961 5.186 
2012 311 1113123.31 137818.00 3070603.439 -921000 23583000 32.487 5.195 
Total 2133 735092.56 61684.00 2570627.192 -8676000 45330000 81.540 7.388 
Market Cap. th LCU 2006 200 10020565.00 1780089.71 24960374.164 768 184595599 21.570 4.343 
2007 311 8558624.60 1136139.75 24215403.642 4800 238806003 38.521 5.599 
2008 334 7150983.72 615662.66 25714774.349 1821 307601105 74.892 7.889 
2009 328 7607552.98 617051.24 23022794.260 4074 216996848 37.972 5.689 
2010 322 9200277.93 837019.81 26651454.931 3259 253128435 35.131 5.441 
2011 320 10500888.32 1097461.98 30209222.747 2537 270903959 33.432 5.356 
2012 310 14243027.17 1781150.66 31469611.942 20625 220753259 21.712 4.150 
Total 1913 9026733.72 972247.01 26274454.106 768 307601105 39.873 5.709 
Return on Shareh. Funds (%) 2006 309 32.51 30.25 80.609 -738 547 44.414 -3.653 
2007 334 28.33 27.62 69.214 -821 329 87.955 -7.158 
2008 347 16.96 20.61 87.769 -617 983 55.431 1.369 
2009 338 13.02 15.23 74.319 -703 546 42.040 -1.465 
2010 322 7.37 14.60 87.963 -864 435 51.857 -5.277 
2011 317 11.63 16.29 52.071 -387 219 17.176 -2.571 
2012 318 22.51 18.89 37.215 -62 289 28.002 3.808 
Total 2061 18.42 20.15 75.533 -864 983 56.935 -2.823 
Return on Total Assets (%) 2006 313 13.45348 12.38000 15.039738 -85.910 59.790 7.426 -.949 
2007 339 12.31693 12.07000 13.888562 -68.610 63.010 6.362 -.875 
2008 349 8.25616 8.65000 18.215318 -87.710 79.400 6.174 -.902 
2009 342 5.86061 6.48500 15.858898 -63.710 79.090 5.204 -.645 
2010 329 4.17979 6.13000 18.810452 -98.880 90.050 10.803 -1.861 
2011 327 5.90211 6.36000 16.652353 -88.530 93.160 8.557 -1.104 
2012 97 8.89196 9.26000 11.679615 -42.820 46.120 4.128 -.725 
Total 2096 8.32050 8.66000 16.636917 -98.880 93.160 7.931 -1.159 
Return on equity (ROE) % 2006 300 31.03530 24.60000 96.535257 -988.330 771.400 55.072 -2.142 
2007 311 27.86318 22.43000 58.876006 -304.440 568.890 36.879 3.641 
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2008 315 15.67657 17.25000 42.584522 -289.550 225.960 12.362 -1.137 
2009 285 9.41989 10.61000 63.053721 -390.720 577.240 34.193 1.552 
2010 294 11.32881 10.92000 55.532387 -260.100 579.550 42.296 3.587 
2011 287 7.60251 11.32000 75.005864 -374.770 859.310 62.053 4.031 
2012 296 2.33356 13.66000 103.127855 -911.760 130.550 73.908 -8.273 
Total 1879 16.66548 16.27000 69.811689 -988.330 859.310 69.107 -.515 
Sales th LCU 2006 282 4379448.68 501310.00 13354557.818 0 160537000 71.733 7.326 
2007 301 4571490.13 581232.00 11849450.329 0 98532000 30.886 5.071 
2008 315 5590980.22 702745.00 14447380.741 0 129943000 33.109 5.152 
2009 303 5935220.00 840488.00 15262905.315 0 137836000 34.147 5.237 
2010 289 6099230.76 909361.00 15316513.148 0 122256000 28.165 4.828 
2011 290 6960271.47 989354.00 17090243.737 0 142436000 27.568 4.742 
2012 314 12265069.41 2173549.50 27408385.481 -15694 169446000 16.594 3.851 
Total 1868 5905265.53 792709.50 15535033.578 -15694 169446000 36.041 5.354 
Independent Non Exec 2006 323 4.06 4.00 2.529 0 13 .310 .596 
2007 342 7.41 7.00 3.322 1 18 .107 .585 
2008 355 7.30 7.00 3.387 0 18 .222 .473 
2009 349 7.40 7.00 3.310 0 18 .235 .529 
2010 336 7.52 7.00 3.212 1 18 .253 .654 
2011 333 7.53 7.00 3.313 0 18 .137 .576 
2012 311 8.14 8.00 3.169 2 16 -.500 .398 
Total 2137 6.95 7.00 3.423 0 18 .122 .509 
Exec Directors 2006 323 6.21 6.00 2.871 1 17 1.762 1.140 
2007 342 6.32 6.00 2.882 1 18 2.164 1.229 
2008 355 6.24 6.00 2.987 0 18 1.850 1.052 
2009 346 6.39 6.00 2.904 1 18 1.974 1.200 
2010 336 6.36 6.00 2.922 0 18 2.575 1.332 
2011 332 6.34 6.00 2.939 0 18 2.327 1.287 
2012 337 6.62 6.00 3.219 1 18 1.307 1.170 
Total 2133 6.33 6.00 2.930 0 18 2.030 1.199 
Board Size 2006 323 10.27 10.00 4.112 2 24 .362 .672 
2007 342 13.73 13.00 4.964 4 28 -.075 .527 
2008 355 13.55 13.00 5.104 0 28 .048 .414 
2009 349 13.73 13.00 4.972 4 28 -.077 .546 
2010 336 13.88 13.00 4.944 4 28 -.057 .597 
2011 333 13.85 13.00 5.047 0 28 -.071 .533 
2012 335 14.76 14.00 5.378 4 28 -.667 .339 
Total 2137 13.27 13.00 5.060 0 28 -.044 .535 
Percentage of Independent 
Non Exec 
2006 323 37.94178 40.00000 18.136509 .000 87.500 .021 -.119 
2007 342 53.58536 54.77273 13.308749 9.091 87.500 .504 -.517 
2008 355 53.36014 55.55556 15.391468 .000 100.000 2.163 -.851 
2009 349 53.82597 55.55556 14.844084 .000 120.000 2.749 -.445 
2010 336 54.10005 55.55556 12.792446 16.667 100.000 .852 -.186 
2011 333 54.03771 55.55556 13.339152 .000 100.000 1.719 -.684 
2012 331 55.70619 57.14286 10.640636 29.412 75.000 -.093 -.461 
Total 2137 51.47244 53.84615 15.632634 .000 120.000 1.338 -.687 
Tobin's Q 2006 323 2.37174 1.12144 15.827946 .000 248.819 200.286 13.793 
2007 342 2.00502 1.48108 5.638739 .000 102.885 302.856 16.944 
2008 355 1.71807 1.08547 8.242619 .000 155.743 347.295 18.538 
2009 349 1.62653 1.04528 7.945544 .000 148.876 341.828 18.397 
2010 336 1.42703 1.08866 2.448131 .000 43.488 261.940 15.308 
2011 333 2.61709 1.14127 16.591778 .000 281.868 248.849 15.323 
2012 331 1.53540 1.26658 .922552 .000 6.100 6.822 2.248 
Total 2137 1.93371 1.15245 10.408080 .000 281.868 456.422 20.285 
Company Age 2006 323 39.08 27.00 30.573 6 151 .861 1.266 
2007 342 42.76 26.00 100.955 5 1818 282.371 16.062 
2008 355 37.05 26.00 30.317 5 151 1.152 1.350 
2009 349 36.75 26.00 30.582 4 151 1.132 1.353 
2010 336 36.63 26.00 30.811 3 151 1.002 1.319 
2011 333 36.23 25.00 31.243 1 151 .945 1.296 
2012 331 39.27 28.00 29.367 0 118 -.029 .913 
Total 2137 38.13 26.00 49.172 0 1818 803.490 22.515 
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4.3 Regression diagnostics 
 
Before the statistical analysis may be conducted, it is important to ensure that the underlying 
assumptions of correlation and regression analysis are in place. Regression diagnostics refers to 
the tests which are performed on data to ensure that the resultant models do not violate the 
assumptions of regression analysis. According to Sheather (2009), multiple regression analysis is 
underpinned by following four underlying assumptions: firstly, there must be a linear relationshp 
between the dependent variable/s (Y1…n) and the independent variable/s (X1…n); (2); secondly, the 
errors must be independent of each other; thirdly, the errors must have a common variance 
(homoscedasticity); and lastly, the errors must be normally distributed with a mean of zero (0).     
 
Assumptions one and three on linearity and the common variance of errors were tested using 
scattergrams (see Appendix 1). The scattergrams for the three performance variables, namely, 
TOB, ROA and ROE showed no discernible pattern in the values plotted. Thus, this 
demonstrates that the data did not violate the assumptions of MRA in as far as linearity and 
variance of errors were concerned. Any discernible patterns would have indicated an uneven 
distribution of the residuals about the regression line. 
 
The second assumption to the effect that the errors must be independent of each other was tested 
by computing the Durbin-Watson for each performance variable. The statistics came out as part 
of the SPSS package output and are summarised in Appendix 2 below. All the regression models 
had Durbin-Watson statistics in the range >1 and <3 thus suggesting that there was no correlation 
between the variables. The values of the Durbin-Watson statistic range from 0 to 4 and as a 
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general rule, the residuals are uncorrelated if the value is approximately 2, with a value close to 0 
indicating strong negative correlation and a value of 4 indicating strong positive correlation.  
 
Multicollinearity testing was performed on the ROA and ROE ratios, as both uses a measure of 
income to determine a return on the resources used to produce this income. Gujarati and 
Damodar (2003, p.361) suggest the following three principal multicollinearity tests, namely, a 
correlation coefficient between the two variables, a variable inflation factor (VIF), and Eigen 
values. The results of the three tests are presented in table 4.8. The correlation coefficient was 
calculated using Microsoft Excel, and displayed a 7% correlation between the two variables 
while the VIF values were calculated using SPSS software, with all values reflecting less than 10 
and therefore providing no evidence of multicollinearity. Finally all the Eigen values, which 
were calculated using SPSS, displayed values well below the guideline of 100-1000, reflecting 
thus no multicollinearity. 
 
The fourth and last assumption of MRA that the errors must be normally distributed with a mean 
of zero (0) was tested by observing the histograms and normal probability plots of the residuals 
(see Appendix 1). In order to assess the normality of the performance variables, a histogram was 
generated and visually examined for normal distribution (Appendix 1). Where the data was not 
normally distributed, the observations were logged using natural logarithms. Histograms were 
generated again and analysed using the transformed data. In all cases the resulting data was 
found to be normally distributed. The data transformed included Tobin’s Q to (logtobinq) with a 
visual inspection of the histograms revealing that the data for all the governance variables 
followed a normal distribution while the normal probability plots showed that all the data points 
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were in an approximate straight line. It was therefore evident that both graphs displayed evidence 
of data normality. 
 
4.4 OLS regression results 
 
Table 4.3 presents the regression results of the relationship between Tobin’s Q (TOB) and the 
governance variables. The results clearly indicated a mixed result between the independent and 
control variables and this performance variable. 
 
The coefficient for the percentage of independent non-executive directors, although displaying a 
positive relationship with TOB, was insignificant as measured by the t-statistic of 0.774 
(p>0.05). Thus, on the basis of the results the alternate hypothesis was rejected, namely, that 
there was a significant positive relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board of directors of publicly listed companies in South Africa and firm performance. The 
results imply that when there were more external board members, the performance of the firm 
tended to deteriorate. However, this contradicts the findings of other empirical studies by 
Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), and Brickley et al. (1994) on independent non-
executive directors promoting the beneficial monitoring and advisory functions to firm 
shareholders. In addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Rosenstein et al (1994) showed that 
the market rewards firms for appointing outside directors. On the other hand, this is consistent 
with the findings of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who suggest that boards expanding for 
political reasons often resulted in too many outsiders on the board and this, in turn, did not 
improve performance. The low level of significance between the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board of directors and firm performance is also consistent with evidence 
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supporting the managerial hegemony theory (Bhagat & Black, 2002). Thus, it should be 
indicated that this variable is not significant as regards TOB. 
 
Similarly, to the percentage of independent non-executive directors, the coefficient for the board 
size, although displaying a positive relationship with TOB, was insignificant as measured by the 
t-statistic of 1.521 (p>0.05). In line with the findings of studies conducted by Jensen (1993), 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996), this study showed that the larger the size of the 
board, the worse the Tobin’s Q. This also confirms studies that support the view that larger 
boards may be overwhelmed by poor internal communications and decision-making processes 
(Yermack, 1996). In addition larger boards may also develop fractions and coalitions that lead to 
group conflict while also displaying a tendency to react slowly and indecisively in a crisis (Huse, 
2007). Furthermore, the argument had been advanced that larger and diverse boards may be more 
easily manipulated than smaller boards on the grounds that it is easier for the CEO to gain 
dominance over the board through various manipulation techniques such as coalition building 
(Huse, 2007).  Thus, board size is not significant in explaining Tobin’s Q for firms in South 
Africa and therefore, the alternate hypothesis is rejected. 
 
The study also suggested that the size of the firm as measured by revenue and assets had a 
negative impact on Tobin’s Q although not significant as measured by the t-statistic of -0.163 
(p>0.5). These results are consistent with findings of Nicholson and Kiel (2003), who found that 
firm size, as measured by revenue and assets is inversely related to the three year average 
Tobin’s Q. This may, however, be explained by the fact that the size of a firm as measured by its 
revenue and asset base does not necessarily enhance performance if the revenue and assets are 
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not put to efficient use (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). The implication was therefore 
that most firms in South Africa were not utilising their size in order to enhance their 
performance. It is of interest that the co-efficient of Hotels and Restaurants industry displayed a 
significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q as measured by the t-statistic of 2.870 (p<0.05). 
However, this may be attributed to the booming tourism industry in South Africa with most 
tourists taking advantage of the world class hotels and restaurants in South Africa (Roelofse, 
2013). Diversified Holding Companies, Financial Services and Real Estate, Transport Services 
and Telecommunications industries all displayed a negative but significant relationship with 
Tobin’s Q. while the co-efficient of Market Capitalisation and Return on Shareholder Funds 
displayed a significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q as measured by t-statistic of 14.192 
(p<0.05) and 5.302 (p<0.05) respectively. The results are consistent with the findings of 
Nicholson and Kiel (2003) who postulated a significant positive correlation between market 
capitalisation and TOB. The coefficient for King III, although displaying a negative relationship 
with TOB, was significant as measured by the t-statistic of -7.151 (p<0.05). This in turn 
demonstrates the influence King III recommendations on the firms listed on the JSE though the 
recommendations of King III are on a “apply or explain” basis hence the negative relationship. 
 
Table 4.3: OLS dependent variable: logtobinq   
 
Model – Equation 1 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.058 .067 
 
15.887 .000 
Operating Rev./Turnover th LCU 7.325E-009 .000 .356 1.099 .272 
Total Assets th LCU -7.522E-011 .000 -.012 -.163 .871 
Shareholders Funds th LCU -1.729E-008 .000 -.530 -9.434 .000 
Net Income th LCU 2.858E-010 .000 .002 .063 .950 
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Market Cap. th LCU 7.951E-009 .000 .633 14.192 .000* 
Return on Shareh. Funds (%) .001 .000 .112 5.302 .000* 
Sales th LCU -6.507E-009 .000 -.309 -.991 .322 
Exec Directors .004 .009 .036 .496 .620 
Percentage of Independent Non Exec .001 .001 .036 .774 .439 
AGRICULTURE & FISHING -.053 .060 -.019 -.886 .376 
CONSTRUCTION -.080 .033 -.062 -2.422 .016 
DIVERSIFIED HOLDING COMPANIES -.139 .039 -.083 -3.529 .000 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND REAL ESTATE -.103 .026 -.127 -3.916 .000 
HEALTH CARE .053 .042 .029 1.250 .212 
HOTELS AND RESTAURENTS .126 .044 .066 2.870 .004* 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY -.049 .028 -.053 -1.780 .075 
MINING & EXTRACTING INDUSTRIES -.013 .029 -.013 -.429 .668 
TELECOMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONICS -.077 .028 -.081 -2.746 .006 
TRANSPORT SERVICES -.190 .057 -.073 -3.360 .001 
Class=Listed .008 .027 .006 .297 .767 
King 3 Indicator -.101 .014 -.149 -7.151 .000** 
Board Size .007 .005 .100 1.521 .128 
a. R Squared = .229 (Adjusted R Squared = .220) 
 
In table 4.4 depicts that, with the exception of Net Income, Market Capitalization and Return on 
Shareholders’ funds measured by t-statistics of 7.292, 5.165, and 35.187 respectively all with 
(p<0.05). The other entire independent and control variables did not play a significant role as 
regards affecting firm profitability in terms of ROA.  
 
Like Tobin’s Q, and as measured by t-statistic of .215 (p>0.05) board composition also has a 
positive but insignificant impact on firm profitability, thus emphasising the fact that the 
independence of a board is not really critical for the effective performance of any firm. The 
results of this study are consistent with the findings of earlier studies, for example, studies 
conducted by Rechner and Dalton, (1986), Fosberg, (1989), Barnhart et al, (1994), Grace, 
  
74 
 
Ireland, and Dunstan (1995), Dalton et al, (1998); Dalton and Daily, (1993), and Cho and Kim 
(2007), thus implying that board composition in the form of outside independent directors does not 
influence the economic performance of a firm. Despite the fact that studies by Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Baysinger and Butler (1985), and Baysinger and Hoskinsson (1990), have asserted that 
the effectiveness of a board depends on an optimal mix of executive and non-executive directors, 
there is very little theory on the determinants of an optimal board composition (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003).  
 
As in the case of Tobin’s Q, the size of the board is also positively related to ROA although not 
significantly as measured by a t-statistic of .815 (p>0.05), thus suggesting that firms in South 
Africa should have smaller boards. This is consistent with the findings of other researchers, for 
example, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who argue that large boards are less 
effective and are easier for the CEO to control than smaller boards. When a board becomes too 
big, it becomes difficult to co-ordinate and process problems (Eisenberg et al. 1998). In addition, 
there is further argument that smaller boards also reduce the possibility of free riding by 
individual directors, and enhance their decision making processes (Sanda et al. 2011; Huse, 
2007). Other empirical research supports this argument, for example, Yermack (1996) 
documented that, in the case of large United States industrial corporations, the market values 
firms with smaller boards more highly than those with larger boards. Similarly, in a Nigerian 
study, Sanda et al (2011) found that, firm performance is positively related to small, as opposed 
to large boards. 
 
The size of the firm as measured by total assets, had an insignificant negative impact on ROA as 
evidenced by the t-statistic of -1.533 (p>0.05). This result is consistent with the findings of 
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Nicholson and Kiel (2003), who suggested that larger companies, as measured by asset size, also 
find it difficult to produce a strong percentage return (ROA) on assets. As in the case of Tobin’s 
Q, the Construction, Financial Services and Real Estate, and the Mining and Extracting 
industries all displayed a negative but significant relationship with ROA as measured by t-
statistics of -2.815, -3.081, and -3.106 respectively and all with a (p<0.05). Similar, to Tobin’s 
Q, the coefficient for the King III report, although displaying a negative relationship with ROA, 
was significant as measured by the t-statistic of -4.910 (p<0.05). 
 
Table 4.4: OLS dependent variable: return on total assets (%) 
   
Model – Equation 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.793 2.491  1.925 .054 
Operating Rev./Turnover th LCU 2.141E-007 .000 .227 .858 .391 
Total Assets th LCU -2.645E-
008 
.000 -.094 -1.533 .125 
Shareholders Funds th LCU -2.770E-
007 
.000 -.185 -4.033 .000 
Net Income th LCU 1.281E-006 .000 .204 7.292 .000* 
Market Cap. th LCU 1.083E-007 .000 .188 5.165 .000* 
Return on Shareh. Funds (%) .148 .004 .605 35.187 .000* 
Sales th LCU -2.709E-
007 
.000 -.280 -1.102 .271 
Exec Directors -.005 .327 -.001 -.015 .988 
Percentage of Independent Non Exec .009 .042 .008 .215 .830 
AGRICULTURE & FISHING .544 2.228 .004 .244 .807 
CONSTRUCTION -3.467 1.232 -.059 -2.815 .005 
DIVERSIFIED HOLDING COMPANIES -2.833 1.469 -.037 -1.928 .054 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND REAL ESTATE -3.020 .980 -.081 -3.081 .002 
HEALTH CARE -2.853 1.600 -.034 -1.784 .075 
HOTELS AND RESTAURENTS -.150 1.637 -.002 -.092 .927 
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MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY -.709 1.029 -.017 -.689 .491 
MINING & EXTRACTING INDUSTRIES -3.423 1.102 -.075 -3.106 .002 
TELECOMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONICS -1.220 1.043 -.028 -1.170 .242 
TRANSPORT SERVICES -4.417 2.108 -.037 -2.095 .036 
Class=Listed 1.842 1.027 .031 1.794 .073 
King 3 Indicator -2.634 .530 -.084 -4.970 .000** 
Board Size .144 .176 .044 .815 .415 
a. R Squared = .491 (Adjusted R Squared = .485) 
 
 
Table 4.5 represents the regression results of the interaction between Return on Equity (ROE) 
and the governance variables. As regards board composition, ROE was negatively related and 
not significant to the percentage of independent non-executive directors with a t-statistic of -
2.146 (p>0.05). This result contradicts the findings of earlier studies that showed that the more 
outsiders there were on a board, the more independent the board and the better the performance 
of the firm thus confirming John and Senbet (1998), argument that boards of directors become 
more independent as the proportion of outside director’s increase. As already mentioned, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), point out that, when boards expand for reasons of political 
expediency, this often results in too many outsiders on the board and this, in turn does improve 
performance. Fosberg (1989) also found a negative relationship between board composition and 
ROE as a firm performance measure. 
 
 The board size was significantly positively related to Return on Equity as measured by the t-
statistic of 2.895 (p<0.05). Resource dependence theories have been used to argue in favour of a 
positive relationship between board size and corporate financial performance (Huse, 2007). 
Resource dependence theory argues that boards form environmental links in order to secure 
resources and, thus, a large board would be better able to do so than a small board (Huse, 2007). 
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It is therefore argued that, the greater the need for external linkages, the larger the board should 
be (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In addition, Huse (2007) argues that interlocking directorates are 
expected to facilitate both communication and inter-organisational coordination and, thus, from 
this perspective it may also be argued that a larger board will be associated with positive 
corporate performance as compared to a smaller board. 
 
It must however be pointed out that all these governance variables are not statistically significant 
in explaining ROE, although the board size, Net Income and Return on Shareholders’ funds are 
all significant. The size of the firm as represented by total assets was positively related to ROE 
but not significant as measured by the t-statistic of 1.242 (p>0.05), with this t-statistic falling 
below the benchmark of < 2 for the t-test. This again confirms that firms in South Africa were 
not utilising their size and assets to enhance financial performance. The coefficient for the King 
III report, although displaying a negative relationship with ROE, was significant as measured by 
the t-statistic of -4.021 (p<0.05). 
 
Table 4.5: OLS dependent variable: return on equity (ROE) % 
   
Model – Equation 3 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 18.671 8.558 
 
2.182 .029 
Operating Rev./Turnover th LCU -1.314E-006 .000 -.441 -1.554 .120 
Total Assets th LCU 7.274E-008 .000 .083 1.242 .214 
Shareholders’ Funds th LCU -6.572E-007 .000 -.140 -2.780 .005 
Net Income th LCU 3.241E-006 .000 .168 5.609 .000* 
Market Cap. th LCU -8.895E-009 .000 -.005 -.125 .901 
Return on Shareh. Funds (%) .427 .013 .596 31.829 .000* 
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Sales th LCU 1.300E-006 .000 .426 1.560 .119 
Exec Directors -2.441 1.129 -.138 -2.162 .031 
Percentage of Independent Non Exec -.307 .143 -.088 -2.146 .032 
AGRICULTURE & FISHING -2.531 7.559 -.006 -.335 .738 
CONSTRUCTION -12.730 4.325 -.066 -2.943 .003 
DIVERSIFIED HOLDING COMPANIES -3.767 5.136 -.015 -.733 .463 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND REAL ESTATE -.175 3.391 -.001 -.052 .959 
HEALTH CARE .745 5.488 .003 .136 .892 
HOTELS AND RESTAURENTS -4.302 5.669 -.015 -.759 .448 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY -2.203 3.579 -.016 -.616 .538 
MINING & EXTRACTING INDUSTRIES -3.934 3.817 -.027 -1.031 .303 
TELECOMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONICS -2.689 3.606 -.019 -.746 .456 
TRANSPORT SERVICES -7.411 7.155 -.020 -1.036 .300 
Class=Listed 1.659 3.513 .009 .472 .637 
King 3 Indicator -7.377 1.835 -.074 -4.021 .000** 
Board Size 1.766 .610 .169 2.895 .004* 
a. R Squared = .424 (Adjusted R Squared = .417) 
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
Based on the findings of this research study, it may be posited that there is a lack of association 
between the firm performance of South African organisations and the board composition and 
board size of the firm concerned. However, this research study did find evidence of a positive 
significant relationship between board size of companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange 
and Return on Equity as a performance measure. In line with international studies conducted in 
developed markets, such as Bhagat & Black (2002); Nicholson & Kiel (2003); Yermack (1996); 
and Fosberg (1989), the findings of this research study suggest that board composition and board 
size are not important determinants of firm performance in South Africa although King III does 
contain recommendations in regard to board composition. The following chapter summarise the 
research study and concludes the study. 
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Chapter V: Summary and Conclusion 
 
It is not possible to overemphasise the importance of corporate governance as it enhances the 
organisational climate for the internal structures and performance of a firm (Sanda et al. 2011). 
Indeed, through the presence of external independent directors, corporate governance creates a 
new dimension as regards the effective running of a corporate entity thereby enhancing a firm’s 
corporate entrepreneurship and competitiveness (Wu, 2003). 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
This empirical study examined the relationship between some measures of corporate governance 
including board composition and board size, and the firm performance of all listed public firms 
on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange from 2006 to 2012 with 2010 when King III came into 
effect, as the base year. The study followed similar research conducted by Bhagat and Black 
(2002), and Yermack (1996) in the United States. There have been previous studies most notably 
the study conducted by Naomi Swartz in 2003 into the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and 
which focused on board structure and intellectual capital as a firm performance measure. 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the research study and chapter 2 contained a review of the relevant 
literature with the chapter also describing corporate governance reforms and theories in South 
Africa which have resulted from King I in 1994, King II in 2002 and then King III in 2009. The 
empirical history of the corporate governance theories (agency and resource dependency theory) 
in various markets and in different contextual settings was examined. This was followed by a 
review of the emergence of corporate governance reforms in South Africa and recommendations 
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of King III on board composition and a discussion of board composition and size and firm 
performance.  
 
Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology utilised in the study, including the background of 
the regression model, the research methods applied, and the validity and reliability, limitations 
and delimitations of the study. The two independent variables of interest were defined as board 
size as measured by the number of directors sitting on the board and board composition as 
measured by the percentage of independent non-executive directors sitting on the board of 
directors. Chapter 3 also discussed and described the population and study sample, data 
collection method and analysis, and defined the period under study. The study was limited to JSE 
listed firms in the period from 2006 to 2012. The size of the sample for this research report was 
1861 firms, over a seven year period. 
Chapter 4 discussed the research findings (Results), including as explanation of the descriptive 
statistics, the regression diagnostics and the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
models. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
In respect of Equation 1 (logtobinq), a t-statistic of .774 (p>0.05) indicated a positive, yet 
insignificant relationship between the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the 
boards of directors of South African firms listed on the JSE Securities Exchange and Tobin’s Q. 
These findings suggest that the independence on the board of directors is not an important 
determinant of firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. In order to decide whether board 
size could be used to explain firm performance, equation 1 also hypothesised that there was a 
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positive and yet insignificant relationship between the board size of South African firms listed on 
the JSE Securities Exchange and Tobin’s Q as a performance measure and as evidenced by a t-
statistic of 1.521 (p>0.05). These findings suggest that board size is not an important determinant 
of firm performance when using Tobin’s Q. 
 
Equation 2 (ROA), hypothesised that there was a positive and insignificant relationship between 
the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors of South African 
publicly listed companies and ROA as a firm accounting performance measure. The findings did 
not support this hypothesis with the t-statistic of the independent variable being calculated as 
0.215 (p>0.05). The alternate hypothesis was therefore rejected. Thus, the findings suggest that 
the presence of a majority of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors is not 
related to ROA as a firm’s accounting performance measure. The same results were obtained as 
regards board size, where there was a positive yet insignificant relationship between the 
independent variable and ROA as evidenced by a t-statistic of 0.815 (p>0.05).   
 
In respect of Equation 3 (ROE), a t-statistic of -2.146 (p>0.05) indicated a negative, and 
insignificant relationship between ROE as a firm accounting performance measure and the 
percentage of independent non-executive directors on a board of directors. In order to decide 
whether board size could explain and predict firm financial performance, equation 3 
hypothesised that there was a positive relationship between board size and ROE as a measure of 
firm accounting performance. The findings indicated a significant relationship as evidenced by a 
t-statistic of 2.895 (p<0.05). Thus, these findings suggest that the percentage of independent non-
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executive directors on the board of directors is not a determinant of firm financial performance, 
while the board size is a determinant when ROE is used as a measure of firm performance.  
 
The control variables, Market Capitalisation, Return on Shareholders Fund, Net Income and 
certain dummy industry variables included in the equations yielded significant positive 
relationships at a 5% confidence level in the 3 regression equations tested although a majority of 
the variables were insignificant at a greater than 5% confident level. The control factors 
contributed to the explanatory power of the models. Although this study found a strong 
significant positive relationship when using ROE as a firm performance measure and board size, 
it is clear from the measure of model fit (R² and adjusted R²) presented in Table 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 
appendix 2 that there are other variables which were not included in the model and which also 
affected firm performance and which needed to be added to the model. Although the R² of below 
0.5 (<50%) and the adjusted R² of below 0.5 (<50%) for all 3 dependent variables indicated that 
the predictive power of the model was low, the results did, however, confirm that the model was 
stable and adequate as a base for testing the hypotheses. As a whole, the findings indicated that 
the contribution of board composition and size to firm performance was explanatory, but mixed.  
 
In conclusion, the empirical findings suggest board composition and board size are not primary 
determinants of firm performance as regards the South African companies listed on the JSE 
Securities Exchange. Overall the findings suggest that despite the importance of good corporate 
governance practices, firm performance when defined by Tobin’s Q, ROA & ROE is not 
primarily dependent on board composition and board size as no positive significant relationship 
was found on the 3 regression equations except for board size and ROE. 
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5.3 Recommendations and areas for further research 
 
Every board should consider whether its size, diversity and demographics render it effective 
(IOD, 2009). The issue of diversity applies to the academic qualifications, technical expertise, 
relevant industry knowledge, experience, nationality, age, race and gender of the board members 
(IOD, 2009). King III notes that directors should be individuals of integrity and courage, and that 
they should possess the relevant knowledge, skills and experience required to bring judgement to 
bear on the business of the company (Deloitte, 2013). In situations in which the directors may 
lack experience, detailed induction as well as formal mentoring and support programmes should 
be implemented (Deloitte, 2013). 
 
Thus, a board should establish a formal induction programme to familiarise incoming directors 
with the company‘s operations, its business environment, and the sustainability issues relevant to 
its business (IOD, 2009; Deloitte, 2013). In addition, the programme should ensure that 
incoming directors are introduced to the members of senior management and to their respective 
duties and responsibilities (Deloitte, 2013). An appropriate induction programme should meet 
the specific needs of both the company and the individual and should enable any new director to 
make the maximum contribution as quickly as possible (IOD, 2009). New directors with either 
no or limited board experience should be developed and educated as regards their duties, 
responsibilities, powers and potential liabilities (IOD, 2009; Deloitte, 2013). Thus mentorship by 
experienced directors is encouraged. It is important to remember that the development of the 
skills of inexperienced directors is vital in alleviating the shortage of the pool of directors 
available for appointment (Deloitte, 2013). 
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It is also possible that some directors who are classified as independent are not truly independent 
of management because they are beholden either to the company or its current CEO in ways 
which are too subtle to be captured in the customary definitions of independence (Bhagat & 
Black, 2002). On that note King III, recommends that, every year, those non-executive directors 
who are classified as independent should undergo an evaluation of their independence by the 
chairman and the board and if the chairman is not independent, the process should be led by the 
lead Independent non-executive director. Independence in this context should be assessed by 
weighing all the relevant factors that may compromise independence while the classification of 
directors as independent or otherwise in the integrated report should be done on the basis of this 
assessment (IOD, 2009). Any term beyond nine years (e.g. three three-year terms) for an 
independent non-executive director should be subject to a particularly rigorous review by the 
board of not only the performance of the director, but also of those factors that may impair 
his/her independence at the time (IOD, 2009). King III noted that, the review should also take 
into account the need for refreshing the board.  
 
The CEOs of companies in different industries (in terms, of number, are the majority of 
independent directors) are too busy with their own business, know too little about another 
business, and are overly generous in compensating another CEO (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). It 
may, thus, be that the “visible” directors, who are well-known persons with limited business 
experience, and often holding multiple directorships as well as adding gender or racial diversity 
to a board, are not, on average, extremely effective as directors (Bhagat & Black, 2002). King III 
recommends that a programme ensuring a staggered rotation of non-executive directors should 
be put in place by the board to the extent that the programme is not already regulated by the 
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company‘s memorandum of incorporation or relevant regulation. The rotation of board members 
should be structured so as to ensure that valuable skills are retained the continuity of knowledge 
and experience maintained and directors with new ideas and expertise are introduced (IOD, 
2009). At least one-third of non-executive directors should retire by rotation yearly, usually at 
the company’s Annual General Meeting or at other general meetings, unless otherwise 
prescribed by any applicable legislation (IOD, 2009). However, these retiring board members 
may be re-elected, provided they are eligible. The board, through the nomination committee, 
should recommend eligibility, while taking into account past performance, contributions and the 
objectivity of business judgement calls (IOD, 2009). 
 
It may be that independent directors who have served for too long become, over time, less 
vigorous monitors (Bhagat & Black, 2002). However, King III recommends that independent 
non-executive directors may serve for longer than nine years if, after an independence 
assessment by the board, there are no relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or 
which appear to affect, the director’s judgement. The assessment should show that the 
independence of character and judgement of the independent director is not in any way affected 
or impaired by the length of service, and a statement to this effect should be included in the 
integrated report (IOD, 2009). King III notes that shareholders are ultimately responsible for the 
composition of the board and it is in their own interests to ensure that the board is properly 
constituted as regards skill and representivity. The procedures in respect of appointments to the 
board should be formal and transparent and should be a matter for the board as a whole, assisted 
by the nomination committee, and subject to shareholder approval (IOD, 2009). 
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A final possibility is that independent directors may add value to a board, but only if they are 
embedded in an appropriate board committee
7
 structure (Deloitte, 2013). Boards should ascertain 
whether potential candidates are competent to be appointed as directors and would be able to 
contribute to the business judgement calls to be made by the board (IOD, 2009). In assessing the 
skills and suitability of a proposed candidate director, there are three aspects that merit 
consideration, firstly, the knowledge and experience required to fill the gap on the board, 
secondly, the apparent integrity of the individual, and lastly, the skills and capacity of the 
individual as regards fulfilling his/her duties to the board (IOD, 2009). Prior to appointment, the 
director’s background should be investigated along the lines of the approach required for listed 
companies by the JSE (IOD, 2009). It is also important to ensure that new directors have not 
been declared delinquent nor are serving probation (S162 of the Act). The nomination committee 
should play a role in this process.  
 
Directors should receive regular briefings on matters relevant to the business of the company as 
well as changes in risks and the laws applicable to the business of the company, including 
accounting standards and policies, and the environment in which the company operates (IOD, 
2009) Incompetent or unsuitable directors should be removed from the office, while taking 
relevant legal and other requirements into consideration (IOD, 2009).   
 
This research study focused exclusively on board composition (defined by the percentage 
representation of independent non-executive directors on the board) and board size and firm 
performance. Further research could be conducted in other areas such as board structure with a 
                                                 
7
 These committee structures includes; nomination, audit, and remuneration committees (Bhagat & Black, 2002) 
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focus on director remuneration, directorship positions held, age, director qualifications, and 
gender diversity among directors. In addition, this research study examined the association 
between board composition and firm performance within an isolated corporate governance 
setting and, thus it could be extended to consider nations with a different corporate governance 
structure to South Africa. 
  
5.4 Limitations of the study 
There are certain limitations to this study. The study focused on board independence and board 
size as important variables in terms of which to examine the correlation between board 
composition and firm performance while other characteristics such as tenure, diversity, age, 
gender, qualification and the background of directors were not examined. In addition, financial 
ratio may not totally reflect the important role of the board in corporate governance. Firm 
performance is a result by interaction between several drivers and socio-economic factors. Thus, 
besides the factors considered in this study, there are many other factors including strategy, 
network, and social environment that may be taken into account. 
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Table 4.6: Frequencies of performance variables 
Statistics 
 
Return on Total Assets 
(%) 
Return on equity (ROE) 
% 
Tobin's Q 
N 
Valid 2330 2123 2369 
Missing 39 246 0 
 
Table 4.7: Means and standard deviations 
 
King 3 Indicator 
Before to King 3 After to King 3 Total 
Operating Rev./Turnover th LCU 
Mean 5646666.14 7616055.52 6478563.38 
Std. Deviation 14188078.612 17853920.340 15866609.636 
Grouped Median 717343.50 1024370.50 833139.00 
N 1340 980 2320 
Total Assets th LCU 
Mean 19171342.00 24838287.89 21565488.97 
Std. Deviation 99891328.991 118037357.589 107942720.940 
Grouped Median 998929.00 1445404.50 1157952.00 
N 1367 1000 2367 
Shareholders Funds th LCU 
Mean 3346321.69 4981656.28 4037210.83 
Std. Deviation 9622065.866 13729557.047 11562734.017 
Grouped Median 430019.00 658289.50 516793.00 
N 1367 1000 2367 
Net Income th LCU 
Mean 705641.95 767789.10 731852.06 
Std. Deviation 2580016.177 2581055.333 2580090.964 
Grouped Median 60241.00 55047.00 59271.50 
N 1367 997 2364 
Market Cap. th LCU 
Mean 8141134.86 10621909.86 9265922.41 
Std. Deviation 24447203.787 30890439.596 27576876.903 
Grouped Median 906730.69 926780.46 921080.18 
N 1173 973 2146 
Return on Shareh. Funds (%) 
Mean 22.44 9.46 16.96 
Std. Deviation 78.641 68.939 74.958 
Grouped Median 23.25 14.72 19.18 
N 1328 970 2298 
Sales th LCU Mean 5137846.37 6793131.26 5851844.73 
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Std. Deviation 13803582.094 17319907.114 15436904.741 
Grouped Median 679494.00 875822.00 759649.00 
N 1201 911 2112 
Independent Non Exec 
Mean 6.59 7.23 6.86 
Std. Deviation 3.464 3.215 3.376 
Grouped Median 6.24 6.86 6.52 
N 1368 1000 2368 
Exec Directors 
Mean 6.29 6.31 6.30 
Std. Deviation 2.911 2.954 2.929 
Grouped Median 5.78 5.81 5.79 
N 1365 999 2364 
Board Size 
Mean 12.87 13.54 13.15 
Std. Deviation 5.025 4.947 5.002 
Grouped Median 12.31 12.87 12.56 
N 1368 1000 2368 
Percentage of Independent Non Exec 
Mean 49.89324 53.05512 51.22849 
Std. Deviation 16.831901 13.835026 15.711285 
Grouped Median 51.98824 54.54539 53.64998 
N 1368 1000 2368 
Tobin's Q 
Mean 1.31784 1.30945 1.31430 
Std. Deviation 1.005193 .868848 .949822 
Grouped Median 1.16448 1.10823 1.14057 
N 1368 1000 2368 
Company Age 
Mean 38.91 36.47 37.88 
Std. Deviation 56.952 30.928 47.733 
Grouped Median 26.29 25.40 25.91 
N 1368 1000 2368 
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Table 4.8: Multicollinearity diagnostics 
Correlation coefficient 
Array 1   ROE             
Array 2   ROA             
                  
Calculated 
coefficient   -0.0689             
                  
                  
Variable Inflation Factor Collinearity Diagnostics 
                  
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients B Sig 
Correlations 
Zero Order Partial Part 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 Constant 1.852 0.000           
  ROA 3.146 0.003 0.425 0.277 0.192 0.580 1.778 
  ROE 2.387 0.000 0.559 0.343 0.23 0.567 1.716 
  
Total 
Assets 4.63E-08 0.000 0.383 0.45 0.319 0.879 1.151 
  DE 0.313 0.001 0.260 0.357 0.281 0.675 1.252 
  
TO-
RATIO 2.58E-02 0.012 0.405 0.248 0.165 0.467 2.120 
                  
Eigen Value Collinearity Diagnostics 
                  
Model Dimension Eigen Value 
Condition 
Index 
Variance 
Proportions 
(Constant)         
1 1 4.434 1.000 0.01         
  2 1.135 1.961 0.00         
  3 1.084 2.075 0.00         
  4 0.812 2.342 0.00         
  5 0.760 2.57 0.00         
  6 0.465 3.171 0.01         
  7 0.201 4.559 0.11         
  8 0.108 6.389 0.44         
  9 0.372 8.324 0.44         
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Appendix 1 – Histograms, P-P plots and scattergrams 
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Appendix 2 – Durbin-Watson statistics 
Durbin-Watson statistics – Tobin’s Q 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .479a .229 .220 .29985 1.773 
Durbin-Watson statistics – ROA 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .701a .491 .485 11.181536 1.910 
Durbin-Watson statistics – ROE 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .651a .424 .417 37.813558 1.917 
 
 
